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【編者按：美國《外交事務(wù)》雜志（Foreign Affairs）最新一期(2013年1-2月刊）登載春秋發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略研究院研究員李世默文章：《中共的生命力——后民主時代在中國開啟》。觀察者網(wǎng)獨家首發(fā)該文章中文版，并附英文版以對照。】

以下為文章全文：

2012年11月，中國共產(chǎn)黨召開了第十八次全國代表大會。在這次大會上，中共順利完成了十年一次的最高權(quán)力交接，新一代領(lǐng)導(dǎo)集體登上政治舞臺。一切正如預(yù)期，習(xí)近平接任中共中央總書記，并將在2013年3月出任中華人民共和國國家主席。

事實證明，這個自信的、崛起的大國的最高權(quán)力交接是平穩(wěn)、周密且有序的。但國際媒體甚至一些中國國內(nèi)的知識分子仍罔顧事實，繼續(xù)把中國描繪成正處于“危急關(guān)頭”。比如，在十八大開幕前夕出版的一期《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》周刊，就匿名引用了某些學(xué)者在近期一次會議上的發(fā)言。這些學(xué)者聲稱，中國的政治現(xiàn)狀是“底層失穩(wěn)、中層失落、上層失控”。

確實，在進(jìn)行政權(quán)交接之前數(shù)月，薄熙來事件對中共形象造成巨大沖擊。繼1989年春夏之交的廣場政治風(fēng)波后，中共最高層的緊密團(tuán)結(jié)一直是中國國內(nèi)政治穩(wěn)定的中流砥柱。而薄事件使中共長期維護(hù)的團(tuán)結(jié)一致的形象受到質(zhì)疑。

雪上加霜的是，連續(xù)20多年保持GDP兩位數(shù)增速的中國經(jīng)濟(jì)，在這關(guān)鍵時刻放緩了腳步，連續(xù)七個季度增長乏力。中國此前一直依靠發(fā)展勞動密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)、政府大規(guī)模投資基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施以及擴(kuò)大出口等舉措，推動快速工業(yè)化的發(fā)展模式似乎已遭遇瓶頸。國內(nèi)外某些人甚至斷言，如果中國的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人無法繼續(xù)創(chuàng)造經(jīng)濟(jì)奇跡，中共的執(zhí)政地位將會動搖，一黨執(zhí)政的中國將走向崩潰。

刊登本文的《外交事務(wù)》雜志封面

然而，這些悲觀預(yù)言者將再一次被證明，他們的水平可能與堅信2012年12月21日是世界末日的人差不多。毋庸置疑，中國的新任領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人習(xí)近平未來的執(zhí)政道路充滿嚴(yán)峻挑戰(zhàn)。但據(jù)此唱衰中共政權(quán)，認(rèn)為中共無法應(yīng)對未來的挑戰(zhàn)，則是大大地誤判了中國的政治形勢，低估了中共執(zhí)政體制的韌性。中共適應(yīng)時勢的能力、選賢任能的體制、深植于民心的政權(quán)合法性，將使其能靈活、高效地應(yīng)對中國的各種問題。

可以預(yù)見，未來十年中國不僅不會崩潰，還會像神州大地上奔馳的高鐵一樣繼續(xù)快速前進(jìn)。中國的新一代領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人將不斷鞏固和完善一黨執(zhí)政的政治模式。這一歷史進(jìn)程，將挑戰(zhàn)西方世界的傳統(tǒng)政治理念，即認(rèn)為政治進(jìn)步的終極目標(biāo)是實行多黨選舉式民主。在這文明古國的政治中心北京，世界也許將見證后民主時代的到來。

上下求索

有些人斷言，一黨制天生缺乏自我糾錯能力。但歷史實踐卻證明這一斷言過于自信。從1949年新中國成立以來，中國共產(chǎn)黨已連續(xù)執(zhí)政63年，在其跌宕起伏的執(zhí)政歷程中，表現(xiàn)出了超凡的適應(yīng)性和自我糾錯能力。上世紀(jì)50年代初，中共發(fā)動了激進(jìn)的土改；50年代末，又發(fā)起了“大躍進(jìn)”運動；從60年代后期到70年代中期， “文化大革命”席卷全國。但令人難以置信的是，同樣是這個黨，早在60年代初就開始試行土地準(zhǔn)私有化；70年代末，鄧小平啟動了市場化改革；到90年代，江澤民通過“三個代表”理論對黨重新定位，主動吸納新社會階層人士入黨，等等。實際上，中共從建黨到1949年前的革命征途中和建國后的治國道路上，曾屢次因嚴(yán)重錯誤而使自身陷入困境，或把國家和民族帶入歧途，但它每次都依靠其自身機(jī)制，而不是其他任何外部力量，一再改錯糾偏、撥亂反正。其中最著名也是最成功的例子就是鄧小平推行的以經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)為中心和改革開放，這一巨大調(diào)整使中國在短短32年間一躍而為世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體。

在政治體制上，中共近三十多年來推動了許多大刀闊斧的改革。在上世紀(jì)八九十年代，中共廢除了領(lǐng)導(dǎo)干部終身制，改行任期制，并明確年齡限制，比如要求政治局常委當(dāng)選時原則上不超過68歲。此前，由于政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人實際上是終身任職，很容易出現(xiàn)長期在位而引發(fā)的大權(quán)獨攬、不受制約等問題。毛澤東可謂典型例子，他結(jié)束了中國肆虐的戰(zhàn)亂，趕走了外國侵略者，是現(xiàn)代中國名副其實的締造者，但也正是這個偉大的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，在長期執(zhí)政的后期，直接發(fā)動了“文化大革命”等浩劫。任期制的確立，確保中共避免再犯最頂層的少數(shù)人長期壟斷政治權(quán)力的錯誤，并為隨后建立促進(jìn)人才向上自由平等流動的機(jī)制奠定基礎(chǔ)。

在外交政策上，為實現(xiàn)中華民族的復(fù)興，中國同樣做出了多次重大調(diào)整。上世紀(jì)50年代，中國一度實行向蘇聯(lián)“一邊倒”的政策；70年代到80年代，中國卻采取了事實上與美國結(jié)盟以遏制蘇聯(lián)的策略。新世紀(jì)以來，中國所堅持的獨立自主的外交方針，頻頻引發(fā)了與美國的摩擦甚至沖突。現(xiàn)在，中國審時度勢，清醒地吸取他國歷史教訓(xùn)， 又提出 “走和平發(fā)展道路”，以免重蹈德國和日本20世紀(jì)上半葉窮兵黷武的覆轍，努力實現(xiàn)一個和平的崛起。

在中國經(jīng)歷十年一次的政治交接時，國內(nèi)外呼吁啟動新一輪政治改革的呼聲日漸高漲。其中最激進(jìn)者催促中國開放多黨選舉，或至少使黨內(nèi)派系競爭合法化。這些呼吁者認(rèn)為，只有通過競爭性選舉，中共才能取得其繼續(xù)執(zhí)政所需的合法性。但這些呼聲忽視了一個最基本的事實：中共一直在進(jìn)行政治改革，堪稱是世界近代史上最具自我革新勇氣和能力的政治組織。當(dāng)然，與2002年胡錦濤出任總書記時相比，中國今天的新一代領(lǐng)導(dǎo)集體面對的將是全新的世界格局，但中國共產(chǎn)黨很可能在習(xí)近平總書記的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，再次通過自我革新，主動適應(yīng)新的形勢，有效應(yīng)對高速變化的國內(nèi)外環(huán)境所帶來的新挑戰(zhàn)。這一過程中，中共通過自身高效靈活的選賢任能體制，不斷選拔任用優(yōu)秀干練的干部充實到政府中去，是其制勝的一大法寶。

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該文章鏈接

能者居上

西方所謂的“中國通”們反復(fù)強(qiáng)調(diào)中國的干部腐敗問題，用薄熙來事件等極端情況傳播聳人聽聞的故事，并以此為據(jù)宣稱中共及其體制已病入膏肓。確實，中共的體制存在著種種弊端，但解鈴還須系鈴人，這些弊病必須通過中共自己從內(nèi)部根治。西方人士或許無法相信，中共作為一個享有中國憲法確認(rèn)并保護(hù)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位的執(zhí)政黨，其內(nèi)部的選賢任能競爭之激烈程度，能夠超過世界上所有的政治組織。

在十八大換屆前，中共的最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)機(jī)構(gòu)--中央政治局共有25名委員，其中只有5人出身背景優(yōu)越，也就是所謂的“太子黨”。其余20人，包括國家主席胡錦濤和政府總理溫家寶，都是平民出身。再看由300多人組成的十七屆中央委員會，出身顯赫者的比例更低。據(jù)此可以說，絕大多數(shù)中共高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都是靠自身努力和激烈競爭獲得晉升的。毋庸諱言，新領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人習(xí)近平的父親是中共元老，但他也同樣經(jīng)歷了長期的基層歷練，十八大當(dāng)選出的新一屆高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，絕大多數(shù)都是基層起家的。

中共如何從制度上保證選賢任能呢？關(guān)鍵之一是有一個強(qiáng)有力的組織機(jī)構(gòu)，即中央組織部。對此西方鮮有人知。中央組織部主持制定了一整套完善的機(jī)制，通過復(fù)雜精細(xì)的程序進(jìn)行干部遴選和評估，不斷選拔出優(yōu)秀的人才。這套機(jī)制的效力，恐怕最成功的商業(yè)公司都會自嘆弗如。任人唯親的現(xiàn)象確實存在，但總體上看，才干和政績是決定晉升的主要標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。

政府以及相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)一年一度地從大學(xué)畢業(yè)生中招錄人員，被錄取者的去向分三類：即政府職能部門、國有企業(yè)，以及政府管轄的事業(yè)單位，如大學(xué)、社區(qū)組織等。大部分新人會從最低一級的科員干起，經(jīng)過幾年的工作積累后，組織部門會根據(jù)其表現(xiàn)，決定是否將其提升到更高的管理職位上，比如副科、科、副處、處。這一區(qū)間的職位包羅萬象，既包括負(fù)責(zé)貧困農(nóng)村的衛(wèi)生工作，也包括負(fù)責(zé)城區(qū)里的招商引資工作。各級干部每年都要接受組織部門的考察，其中包括績效定量考核，征求上級、下級和同事的反饋意見，以及個人操守審查。此外，有關(guān)部門還頻繁廣泛地進(jìn)行民意調(diào)查，內(nèi)容既涉及對國家整體方向的滿意度，也包括對各地具體政策的意見建議。在完成對候選人的全部考察后，有關(guān)部門還會公開征求公眾意見，最后由組織部門匯總整理成詳盡的考察材料，報送上級黨委，由黨委召開集體會議并慎重討論后，確定提升人選。

完成最初的晉升后，公務(wù)人員的發(fā)展方向面臨多種選擇。中共的干部可以在政府職能部門、國有企業(yè)，以及社會事業(yè)單位等三大領(lǐng)域內(nèi)輪轉(zhuǎn)任職。具體來說，一位干部可能從經(jīng)濟(jì)管理工作調(diào)任政治或社會治理工作，也可能從傳統(tǒng)意義上的政府機(jī)構(gòu)調(diào)任國有企業(yè)或大學(xué)的管理職位。組織部門常常派送大批年輕有為的干部出國進(jìn)修，了解世界各地的先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗，比如他們會定期組織一些人到哈佛大學(xué)肯尼迪政府學(xué)院和新加坡國立大學(xué)等機(jī)構(gòu)培訓(xùn)。

公務(wù)員們經(jīng)歷長期的基層工作鍛煉并不斷積累實踐經(jīng)驗后，佼佼者有望再次晉升，成為副局和正局級干部。這一級別的干部，有可能領(lǐng)導(dǎo)數(shù)百萬人口的城區(qū)，也有可能管理年營業(yè)收入數(shù)億美元的國有企業(yè)。因此，對局級干部的選拔更為嚴(yán)格。從統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)來看，2012年，中國科級與副科級干部約為90萬人，處級與副處級干部約為60萬人，而局級與副局級干部僅為4萬人。

在局級干部中，只有最為出眾的極少數(shù)人才有機(jī)會繼續(xù)晉升，最終進(jìn)入中共中央委員會。在一位干部的職業(yè)生涯中，從積累基層經(jīng)驗開始，到進(jìn)入高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)序列，期間一般要經(jīng)過二三十年的工作歷練。因此幾乎所有高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，都有在中國社會各大領(lǐng)域主持工作的豐富管理經(jīng)驗。僅就十七屆中央政治局而言，25人中就有19人兼有領(lǐng)導(dǎo)省、部工作的經(jīng)驗。值得一提的是，作為地方政府的省，在幅員上要超過世界上大多數(shù)國家；作為中央部門的部，在預(yù)算上要超過一般國家的整個政府。事實上，具有上千年歷史的帝國官僚體系是中國的政治中堅和文化傳統(tǒng)，今天中共的組織部門創(chuàng)造性地繼承了這一獨特的歷史遺產(chǎn)，并制定了現(xiàn)代化的制度以培養(yǎng)當(dāng)代中國的政治精英。如果要論政府管理經(jīng)驗，巴拉克?奧巴馬第一次問鼎美國總統(tǒng)時，其資歷可能還比不上中國一個縣的負(fù)責(zé)人。

習(xí)近平的履歷就是非常鮮明的例證。在過去的大約30年間，習(xí)近平從貧困地區(qū)相當(dāng)于副科的村干部做起，跨過一個又一個臺階，一直做到政治局委員兼上海市委書記。在他成為中央領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人之前，他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)過的地區(qū)總?cè)丝诶塾嬕殉^1.5億，創(chuàng)造的GDP合計超過1.5萬億美元。習(xí)近平是這一代高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的縮影，他的政治生涯充分證明了選賢任能體制是當(dāng)代中國政治的巨大驅(qū)動力，所有位高權(quán)重者無不一步一個腳印，履歷扎實豐富。

革故鼎新

中國集中化的選賢任能政治模式，還能激發(fā)政府的創(chuàng)新精神。中央政府的頂層設(shè)計經(jīng)過地方的小規(guī)模試點驗證后，再總結(jié)經(jīng)驗全國推廣，這一模式的成功例證不勝枚舉。其中最著名的，莫過于鄧小平在80年代設(shè)立“經(jīng)濟(jì)特區(qū)”的創(chuàng)舉。在中國最早的經(jīng)濟(jì)特區(qū)深圳，政府放開計劃指令，按照市場原則搞活經(jīng)濟(jì)。深圳經(jīng)濟(jì)迅速騰飛，中央政府立即總結(jié)經(jīng)驗，并把經(jīng)濟(jì)特區(qū)的政策擴(kuò)大推廣到廣東省珠海市、汕頭市、福建省廈門市、上海浦東以及海南省的眾多地區(qū)。

30多年來，全國各地成千上萬的制度試驗不斷生根發(fā)芽，從下至上地推動著中國的改革。選賢任能的激烈競爭激發(fā)地方干部中的佼佼者勇于探索，期望通過政績脫穎而出。在出席十八大的2326名代表中，中國西南偏遠(yuǎn)省份云南省委副書記仇和頗為引人注目。在剛結(jié)束的十八大上，仇和當(dāng)選中央候補(bǔ)委員，這意味著這位55歲的“個性”干部正式步入中共高層。仇和的履歷，是中國政治改革者成長的一個縮影。仇和出生于貧窮的農(nóng)民家庭，八個兄弟姐妹中，曾有兩個弟弟因為營養(yǎng)不良和疾病夭折。“文革”結(jié)束后，中國恢復(fù)高考，仇和經(jīng)由這一改變命運的階梯，考入大學(xué)。參加工作后，仇和先是在政府部門基層歷練，于上世紀(jì)90年代起任職江蘇省沭陽縣縣委書記。其時沭陽縣是全國最貧窮的縣之一，幾乎沒有像樣的工業(yè)企業(yè)，全縣人口多達(dá)170萬，但人均年GDP僅有250美元，不及全國平均水平的五分之一。當(dāng)時的沭陽縣可謂一窮二白，且犯罪高發(fā)、腐敗肆虐。

仇和新官上任就連燒幾把火，果斷實行大量實驗性政策，在當(dāng)?shù)匾鹁薮鬆幾h。當(dāng)時的情況下，如果實驗失敗，仇和的政治生命也必將夭折。他的第一把火，燒向了沭陽長期滯后的經(jīng)濟(jì)。1997年，仇和推出了市政建設(shè)債券強(qiáng)制購買計劃，要求沭陽縣民眾購買建設(shè)債券，以支持急需的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)（據(jù)公開報道，仇和規(guī)定，每個財政供養(yǎng)人員扣除工資總額10％，每個農(nóng)民出8個義務(wù)工，組成修路隊，在高峰時，扣款達(dá)到20％，甚至離退休人員的工資，也被扣除10％用作交通建設(shè)。）這一舉措后來證明是一箭雙雕。首先，仇和作為縣委書記根本無權(quán)開征新稅，因此無法通過增稅募集建設(shè)資金；其次，建設(shè)債券為沭陽縣民眾提供了投資機(jī)會，債券持有人后來都收回了本息，這就比純粹增稅更勝一籌。此外，仇和要求縣政府所有干部都必須完成一定數(shù)額的招商引資指標(biāo)。為了吸引投資，政府一方面大規(guī)模投資該地區(qū)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，另一方面為投資者提供稅收和土地出讓優(yōu)惠。短短幾年間，數(shù)千家私營企業(yè)蜂擁而來，沭陽縣從該地區(qū)長期的貧窮落后分子，一舉成為生機(jī)勃勃的市場經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)頭羊。

仇和的第二把火燒向猖獗的腐敗和持續(xù)惡化的干群關(guān)系。90年代晚期，仇和推出兩項開創(chuàng)性舉措，提高干部選拔的透明度和競爭性。其一是推行干部任前公示制，以廣泛征求意見。其二是引入村干部選舉“兩票制”，即先由村民在本村黨員中票選出若干名村干部候選人，再由黨委在票數(shù)最多的兩人中選出最終人選。

仇和的試驗最初遭到當(dāng)?shù)馗刹亢兔癖姷膹?qiáng)烈抵制，但他冒著風(fēng)險堅決推進(jìn)，終于成功地把沭陽這個當(dāng)年全國著名的貧困縣帶領(lǐng)成為江蘇省的工商業(yè)先進(jìn)縣，并率先開啟城鎮(zhèn)化進(jìn)程，吸引全國不少貧困縣前來學(xué)習(xí)取經(jīng)。他倡導(dǎo)的干部任前公示制在全國廣為推行，村級干部的差額選舉方式也已被引入更高層的黨組織選舉中。仇和本人的政治生涯也更上層樓，先后出任江蘇省副省長、昆明市委書記、云南省委副書記，并在十八大上當(dāng)選中央候補(bǔ)委員。

某些批評者即使不得不承認(rèn)中共具備自我改革能力，并且能做到選賢任能，他們依然堅持質(zhì)疑這個政權(quán)的合法性。西方預(yù)設(shè)了一個假定的前提：政權(quán)合法性的唯一來源，就是多黨競爭選舉。依據(jù)這一假設(shè)，由于中國沒有多黨制選舉，中共的政權(quán)自然就是無本之木。中共的批評者還進(jìn)而沿著這一邏輯，多年來不斷預(yù)言這個政權(quán)行將崩潰，幾十年已經(jīng)過去了，中國的發(fā)展和中共的壯大一再證明著這個預(yù)言的荒誕。近幾年來，上述預(yù)言又改頭換面，聲稱中共之所以還能維持統(tǒng)治，僅僅是因為最近三十多年中國經(jīng)濟(jì)一直保持著高速增長，即中共政權(quán)憑借“政績”來維系著合法性。

坦率地說，驕人政績的確是中共合法性的一大來源。據(jù)2011年美國皮尤研究中心在中國進(jìn)行的民意調(diào)查顯示， 高達(dá)87%的中國民眾對國家的未來方向表示滿意； 66%的民眾認(rèn)為過去五年中生活水平顯著提高；74%的民眾相信未來五年生活會繼續(xù)改善。不過，“政績”只是中共獲得民眾支持的原因之一，中共執(zhí)政合法性的真正根基和內(nèi)核，還須追溯到中國的民族主義和更為根本性的道德合法性。

1949年中華人民共和國成立時，中國共產(chǎn)黨在天安門廣場樹立了人民英雄紀(jì)念碑。紀(jì)念碑以一組浮雕展示了中國人民在近現(xiàn)代歷史上頑強(qiáng)拼搏，最終建立中華人民共和國的歷程。按照常理推測，既然中共是一個馬克思列寧主義的政黨，那么紀(jì)念碑的浮雕主題自然應(yīng)該首先強(qiáng)調(diào)共產(chǎn)主義的意識形態(tài)，諸如馬克思創(chuàng)作的《共產(chǎn)黨宣言》，或者1921年中共建黨。但事實并非如此，浮雕的開篇主題是1839年的“虎門銷煙”，當(dāng)時清朝的欽差大臣林則徐公開焚毀了沒收來的英商走私鴉片，英國借機(jī)對華開戰(zhàn)，史稱“第一次鴉片戰(zhàn)爭”。中國戰(zhàn)敗，向英國割地賠款求和，中華民族從此陷入“百年國恥”。在之后的一百多年間，中國遭受了無數(shù)次入侵、戰(zhàn)亂和饑荒，直到1949年新中國成立，才迎來眾所周知的歷史性轉(zhuǎn)折。一直到今天，人民英雄紀(jì)念碑依舊是中國最神圣的公共地標(biāo)，充分彰顯著中共建國的道德權(quán)威。

中國共產(chǎn)黨不僅是新中國的締造者，同時也是中國現(xiàn)代化的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者。自從1935年遵義會議上確立了毛澤東的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位之后，中共的宗旨就一直是復(fù)興中華民族，而不是向世界輸出共產(chǎn)主義革命。以此為起點，中共吸納了馬克思主義，逐漸形成了中國化的社會主義。這種社會主義不同于蘇聯(lián)式共產(chǎn)主義，而更多契合中國歷史悠久的儒家平等主義訴求。中國化的社會主義、中國的文化傳統(tǒng)，以及為現(xiàn)代化的訴求所付出的巨大犧牲，一起構(gòu)成了中共深深植根民心的道德合法性，這絕非經(jīng)濟(jì)增長所帶來的“政績合法性”所能相提并論的。由此就不難理解，在中共執(zhí)政以來的63年里，雖然經(jīng)歷了那么多次極為困難的歷史階段，包括災(zāi)難性的“大躍進(jìn)”和“文化大革命”時期，社會主體包括中下層也從未對中共失去信任。這種信任使中共有時間和空間進(jìn)行反思調(diào)整，開展自我革新。從高速的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長到成功的太空探索，當(dāng)代中國所取得的成就無一不使國民——尤其是青年一代——的民族主義情緒更加高漲。未來幾十年中，隨著中國的進(jìn)一步崛起，中共獲得的政治支持只會水漲船高。

當(dāng)然，為了保持政治穩(wěn)定，中共也不得不采取某些壓制措施。因此，西方的一些中國問題專家堅持認(rèn)為，鎮(zhèn)壓就是中共得以實行統(tǒng)治的真正力量。他們指出中國實行的嚴(yán)格審查制度、對異議人士采取的打壓舉措，并對此進(jìn)行批評。他們說的這些都是事實。其實中共清楚知道，壓制不是鞏固執(zhí)政地位之道，并務(wù)實地采取了更巧妙的遏制策略。具體而言，就是允許并保障絕大多數(shù)民眾最大程度的個人自由。今天的中國民眾，要比近代史上任何一個時期都享有更多的自由，大部分人可以自由生活、自主擇業(yè)、自行創(chuàng)業(yè)，在海內(nèi)外自由旅行，在網(wǎng)上公開批評政府而不用擔(dān)心受到打擊報復(fù)。與此同時，政府堅決打擊極少數(shù)旨在顛覆中共政權(quán)的政治反對人士。眾所周知，近十年來網(wǎng)絡(luò)、報刊上對政府的批評呈爆發(fā)式增長，對此政府并未嚴(yán)厲打壓；全國各地因政策爭議引發(fā)的群體性事件，每年多達(dá)數(shù)萬起，但基本上都以和平方式平息。然而，政府對于旨在推翻現(xiàn)有政治制度的極少數(shù)人絕不會稍有容情，比如激進(jìn)的劉曉波鼓吹終結(jié)中共執(zhí)政地位，結(jié)果就被重判入獄。

當(dāng)然，中共的執(zhí)政地位并非高枕無憂。當(dāng)下，腐敗猖獗對中共的聲譽構(gòu)成巨大損壞。實際上，與其說腐敗是中國政治制度自身固有的問題，不如說是國家快速發(fā)展的副產(chǎn)品。一個半世紀(jì)前，當(dāng)美國經(jīng)歷經(jīng)濟(jì)快速增長和工業(yè)急劇擴(kuò)張時，暴力犯罪、貧富分化和官員腐敗程度比今日中國更甚。就當(dāng)代的橫向比較而言，據(jù)透明國際發(fā)布的全球清廉指數(shù)排名，中國位居第75位，且呈逐年上升之勢，排名高于很多實行多黨選舉的所謂民主制國家，譬如希臘（第80位）、印度（第95位）、印度尼西亞與阿根廷（并列第100位）、菲律賓（第129位）。可見，中共的腐敗問題遠(yuǎn)非無可救藥，而且依托民眾對中共的高度認(rèn)同和支持，完全有時間和機(jī)會從容應(yīng)對這一艱巨挑戰(zhàn)。

龍的時代

十八大選舉產(chǎn)生的新領(lǐng)導(dǎo)集體將在未來十年中領(lǐng)導(dǎo)中國。這十年中，中國將面臨重重挑戰(zhàn)，而中共自我改革的適應(yīng)能力、選賢任能的組織制度、深植民心的執(zhí)政合法性，將成為其戰(zhàn)勝各種挑戰(zhàn)的堅強(qiáng)依托。當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟(jì)增速放緩的勢頭令人不安，但這一現(xiàn)象更多屬于正常的經(jīng)濟(jì)周期，并不意味中國經(jīng)濟(jì)遭遇到結(jié)構(gòu)性瓶頸。在未來二三十年中，由于城鎮(zhèn)化和創(chuàng)業(yè)型經(jīng)濟(jì)的助力，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)良好的增長態(tài)勢將至少再保持一代人。1990年，只有25%的中國人居住在城市里，今天這一人數(shù)已超過半數(shù)，增至51%，并有望在2040年前達(dá)到75%。這意味著中國將有近10億城市人口，產(chǎn)生對新建道路、住房、供能、通訊基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施等的極大需求。即使基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和房地產(chǎn)建設(shè)產(chǎn)生暫時性泡沫，也會被巨大的需求消化掉。事實上，在未來若干年，中國社會的城市化進(jìn)程使決策層必須保持甚至加大對這些領(lǐng)域的投資力度。投資對經(jīng)濟(jì)的拉動效應(yīng)，以及新增城市人口的生產(chǎn)和消費能力，足以推動經(jīng)濟(jì)高速增長。中共的政治權(quán)威，以及卓越的政策制定和施行能力，將為中國成功實現(xiàn)這一歷史跨越保駕護(hù)航。

與此同時，創(chuàng)業(yè)型經(jīng)濟(jì)將幫助中國克服其出口驅(qū)動型增長模式的痼疾。在中國外部，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退以及人民幣升值，正逐漸擠壓中國的出口。在中國國內(nèi)，沿海工業(yè)地區(qū)勞動力成本上升，削弱了出口的價格優(yōu)勢。但是，這些問題會在市場中自然消化。畢竟中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的奇跡不是靠政府高層設(shè)計出來的，而是通過大力發(fā)展市場經(jīng)濟(jì)，培育了一大批活躍的私營企業(yè)扎實干出來的。在沿海地區(qū)，許多企業(yè)的業(yè)務(wù)正迅速向價值鏈的高端延伸，一些低端制造業(yè)開始從沿海向內(nèi)地遷移，以有效控制勞動力成本，這正好契合了中西部地方政府加大基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資、促進(jìn)產(chǎn)業(yè)升級創(chuàng)新的思路。

中國的創(chuàng)業(yè)型新經(jīng)濟(jì)更是朝氣蓬勃，將繼續(xù)推動整體經(jīng)濟(jì)的高速度和高質(zhì)量的發(fā)展。近年來，無數(shù)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)創(chuàng)業(yè)者從零開始，打造全球網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)濟(jì)的領(lǐng)頭羊企業(yè)，僅阿里巴巴一家公司就在短短幾年里創(chuàng)造了上百萬的就業(yè)和從商機(jī)會。

確實，十八大后，政府需要推出一系列經(jīng)濟(jì)改革舉措。例如，在某些領(lǐng)域，國有企業(yè)過于膨脹，擠壓了民營企業(yè)的發(fā)展空間，導(dǎo)致經(jīng)濟(jì)活力下降。政府已經(jīng)看到這些問題，并在醞釀出臺硬性要求國有企業(yè)向股東分紅和其它限制橫向擴(kuò)張的調(diào)整性政策。止步不前的金融自由化政策有望重啟，或?qū)⒑w利率市場化和發(fā)展中小型私營金融機(jī)構(gòu)。這將打破國有銀行的壟斷地位，進(jìn)一步激活信貸市場。上述種種舉措，都將大大有利于資本向產(chǎn)業(yè)投資。

隨著中國經(jīng)濟(jì)日趨開放，社會政策方面也需適時調(diào)整。在完善社會管理方面，決策者可能會雙管齊下。首先，中共將致力于增強(qiáng)包容性，江澤民時期開啟的吸納新社會階層人士入黨的思路有望繼續(xù)延續(xù)。其次，中共將嘗試讓合法的非政府組織參與社會福利管理。隨著城鎮(zhèn)化的快速推進(jìn)，中國將出現(xiàn)一個龐大的中等收入階層。令西方人士大跌眼鏡的是，新出現(xiàn)的中產(chǎn)階層并不追求抽象的政治訴求，而是十分關(guān)注切實的“民生”問題。要應(yīng)對如此多的新問題，單靠政府包打天下恐怕不行。因此，向私人企業(yè)和非政府組織開放醫(yī)療、教育服務(wù)領(lǐng)域，就成為一舉兩得的政策選項。據(jù)說廣東已經(jīng)率先開展類似試點。

腐敗無疑是最難攻克的關(guān)口。近年來，中共一些高級干部的親屬利用其政治影響建立關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)，以謀取商業(yè)利益。從高層到地方，都有政經(jīng)精英千絲萬縷的裙帶關(guān)系網(wǎng)，無時無刻不在損害民眾對中共的合法性認(rèn)同。在反腐方面，中共正逐漸摸索出新思路，并有望在換屆完成后全力出擊。在具體的反腐舉措上，很可能是三管齊下。在當(dāng)前所有的反腐機(jī)構(gòu)中，最重要的莫過于中共中央紀(jì)律檢查委員會。中央紀(jì)委地位崇高，其負(fù)責(zé)人一般都由政治局常委擔(dān)任，紀(jì)委權(quán)力運作在起動司法程序之前，可直接要求有腐敗嫌疑的黨員在規(guī)定的時間和地點交待問題，這在一定程度上避免了繁瑣的法律障礙。近年以來，在對腐敗干部的追查中，紀(jì)委的角色和作用越來越大。在2011年，紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察機(jī)關(guān)共立案137859件，相關(guān)責(zé)任人受到黨紀(jì)處分，甚至被移送司法。在1989年的政治風(fēng)波中，腐敗問題曾是一大導(dǎo)火索。自此之后中共對反腐常抓不懈，當(dāng)前的查處數(shù)字接近1989年前的四倍，即為最鮮明的例證。核心領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層的違法違紀(jì)問題對中共的威信損害最大，新的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)集體是否會支持中紀(jì)委打破禁忌，從頂層果斷反腐，將具有風(fēng)向標(biāo)的意義。

近年來，國有媒體和私營媒體都日趨獨立，已成為政府反腐敗的重要支持力量。干部的腐敗行為一旦被曝光，就會在網(wǎng)上迅速傳播，形成媒體事件。有關(guān)部門會迅速追查被曝光的腐敗案件，并發(fā)布調(diào)查結(jié)果。這是全新的現(xiàn)象，其中不乏爭議性問題，尤其是媒體行業(yè)自身也很腐敗。賄賂記者和新聞造假早已司空見慣。如果這一情形無法迅速改觀，中國的媒體將很快喪失僅有的一點公信力。

因此政府換屆之后，或?qū)募訌?qiáng)政治監(jiān)管和法律約束，促進(jìn)新興媒體行業(yè)的發(fā)展和成熟。政府已在討論制定有關(guān)行業(yè)法規(guī)，以保護(hù)真實、合法的新聞報道，并懲戒誹謗、不實的謠言。或許有人懷疑政府試圖以此控制媒體，但更重要的是，媒體應(yīng)借此機(jī)會提高自己的公信力。一個索賄和造謠事件頻發(fā)的新聞媒體行業(yè)，是不可能真正遏制腐敗的。

最后，中共會在黨內(nèi)促進(jìn)開放性競爭，這在一定程度上是基層各種創(chuàng)新性實驗的啟發(fā)。黨內(nèi)競爭將有助于遏制黨員的不當(dāng)行為。胡錦濤總書記提出要推行“黨內(nèi)民主”，支持用差額選舉產(chǎn)生黨的各級委員會，這一提法在十八大上獲得熱烈擁護(hù)。

鳳凰涅槃

如果十八大的戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃能夠一一落實，2012年將被后世視為世界政治史的分水嶺。迄今為止，世界依舊受制于西方式選舉民主的話語霸權(quán)，認(rèn)為只有多黨選舉才能保證良治，并天生具有合法性。與中國的崛起形成鮮明對照的是，西方世界正陷入政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)的雙重危機(jī)。冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后僅僅一代人的時間，美國的中產(chǎn)階級已然大批消亡；基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施大量失修而無人問津；政治上無論是選舉還是立法，都受制于資本和利益集團(tuán)操縱；巨額赤字和負(fù)債吞噬了未來幾代人的財富，民眾生活水平持續(xù)下滑態(tài)勢不可避免。在大西洋彼岸，歐盟各國在政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會各領(lǐng)域迅速衰朽。至于雄心勃勃的歐洲計劃，現(xiàn)在已無異于一條觸礁擱淺的船。而在此期間，中國不僅使幾億人擺脫了貧困，還一舉成為世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的引擎。

西方遭遇的這些困境都是自找的。由于過分自負(fù)自滿地相信選舉制度是絕對可靠的，西方民主政治已經(jīng)缺失了自我修正的能力。選舉被看作是最終目的，而不是形成良政的手段。在選舉政治下，選出出類拔萃的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人已經(jīng)困難重重，有能力的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人若想在現(xiàn)有體制內(nèi)有所作為，更是難于登天。即使偶爾有少數(shù)出色的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人上臺，還是免不了要面對被政治、法律桎梏牢牢捆住手腳的局面，實際上是寸步難行。就在美國國務(wù)卿希拉里?克林頓穿行往來與世界各地，鼓吹選舉民主的同時，美國政府各部門的合法性正瀕臨破產(chǎn)。今年11月，美國民眾對國會的支持率只有可憐的18%；對總統(tǒng)的支持率稍高，約為50%；甚至一直標(biāo)榜政治獨立的最高法院，其支持率最近也跌破了50%。

許多發(fā)展中國家已意識到，民主不是包治百病的靈丹妙藥。對這些彷徨者來說，中國的成功無疑更具有啟發(fā)性。中國的崛起與西方民主國家的衰落，向全世界提供了鮮明的對照。當(dāng)然，中國模式的政治制度不可能取代西式選舉民主，因為中國從不將自己的政治模式包裝成普世通用的典范，也不會對外輸出。但中國的模式足以啟發(fā)各國思考，如果一國政治制度不契合本國的文化、歷史條件，結(jié)果一定是水土不服。中國模式的意義，不在于向世界各國提供足以替代民主制的靈丹妙藥，而在于從實踐上證明了良政的模式不是單一而是多元的，各國都能找到適合本國的政治制度。24年前，政治學(xué)家弗朗西斯?福山預(yù)言民主將一統(tǒng)天下，慨嘆歷史從此終結(jié)，世界陷入一片靜寂。現(xiàn)在看來，福山是杞人憂天，一個更精彩的時代正緩緩拉開帷幕。

（本文原文刊發(fā)于最新一期美國《Foreign Affairs》雜志，作者中文首發(fā)于觀察者網(wǎng)站）

"Reprinted by permission of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (January/February 2013). Copyright 2013 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. (www.ForeignAffairs.com)

李世默是上海的風(fēng)險投資家和政治學(xué)者，閱讀該作者專欄請點擊 

The Life of the Party 

The Post-Democratic Future Begins in China

By Eric X. Li

January/February 2013

ERIC X. LI is a venture capitalist and political scientist in Shanghai.

In November 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 18th National Congress, setting in motion a once-in-a-decade transfer of power to a new generation of leaders. As expected, Xi Jinping took over as general secretary and will become the president of the People's Republic this March. The turnover was a smooth and well-orchestrated demonstration by a confidently rising superpower. That didn't stop international media and even some Chinese intellectuals, however, from portraying it as a moment of crisis. In an issue that was published before the beginning of the congress, for example, The Economist quoted unnamed scholars at a recent conference as saying that China is "unstable at the grass roots, dejected at the middle strata and out of control at the top." To be sure, months before the handover, the scandal surrounding Bo Xilai, the former party boss of the Chongqing municipality, had shattered the CCP's long-held facade of unity, which had underwritten domestic political stability since the Tiananmen Square upheavals in 1989. To make matters worse, the Chinese economy, which had sustained double-digit GDP growth for two decades, slowed, decelerating for seven straight quarters. China's economic model of rapid industrialization, labor-intensive manufacturing, large-scale government investments in infrastructure, and export growth seemed to have nearly run its course. Some in China and the West have gone so far as to predict the demise of the one-party state, which they allege cannot survive if leading politicians stop delivering economic miracles.

Such pessimism, however, is misplaced. There is no doubt that daunting challenges await Xi. But those who suggest that the CCP will not be able to deal with them fundamentally misread China's politics and the resilience of its governing institutions. Beijing will be able to meet the country's ills with dynamism and resilience, thanks to the CCP's adaptability, system of meritocracy, and legitimacy with the Chinese people. In the next decade, China will continue to rise, not fade. The country's leaders will consolidate the one party model and, in the process, challenge the West's conventional wisdom about political development and the inevitable march toward electoral democracy. In the capital of the Middle Kingdom, the world might witness the birth of a post-democratic future.

ON-THE-JOB LEARNING

The assertion that one-party rule is inherently incapable of self-correction does not reflect the historical record. During its 63 years in power, the CCP has shown extraordinary adaptability. Since its founding in 1949, the People's Republic has pursued a broad range of economic policies. First, the CCP initiated radical land collectivization in the early 1950s. This was followed by the policies of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s to mid-1970s. After them came the quasi-privatization of farmland in the early 1960s, Deng Xiaoping's market reforms in the late 1970s, and Jiang Zemin's opening up of the CCP's membership to private businesspeople in the 1990s. The underlying goal has always been economic health, and when a policy did not work-for example, the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution-China was able to find something that did: for example, Deng's reforms, which catapulted the Chinese economy into the position of second largest in the world.

On the institutional front as well, the CCP has not shied away from reform. One example is the introduction in the 1980s and 1990s of term limits for most political positions (and even of age limits, of 68–70, for the party's most senior leadership). Before this, political leaders had been able to use their positions to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao Zedong was a case in point. He had ended the civil wars that had plagued China and repelled foreign invasions to become the father of modern China. Yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes, such as the Cultural Revolution. Now, it is nearly impossible for the few at the top to consolidate long-term power. Upward mobility within the party has also increased.

In terms of foreign policy, China has also changed course many times to achieve national greatness. It moved from a close alliance with Moscow in the 1950s to a virtual alliance with the United States in the 1970s and 1980s as it sought to contain the Soviet Union. Today, its pursuit of a more independent foreign policy has once more put it at odds with the United States. But in its ongoing quest for greatness, China is seeking to defy recent historical precedents and rise peacefully, avoiding the militarism that plagued Germany and Japan in the first half of the last century.

As China undergoes its ten-year transition, calls at home and abroad for another round of political reform have increased. One radical camp in China and abroad is urging the party to allow multiparty elections or at least accept formal intraparty factions. In this view, only full-scale adversarial politics can ensure that China gets the leadership it needs. However sincere, these demands all miss a basic fact: the CCP has arguably been one of the most self-reforming political organizations in recent world history. There is no doubt that China's new leaders face a different world than Hu Jintao did when he took over in 2002, but chances are good that Xi's CCP will be able to adapt to and meet whatever new challenges the rapidly changing domestic and international environments pose. In part, that is because the CCP is heavily meritocratic and promotes those with proven experience and capabilities.

MAKING THE GRADE

China watchers in the West have used reports of corruption-compounded by sensational political scandals such as the Bo Xilai affair-to portray the ruling party as incurably diseased. The disease exists, to be sure, but the most important treatment is the party itself. As counterintuitive as it might seem to Westerners, the CCP, whose political preeminence is enshrined in the Chinese constitution, is one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world.

Of the 25 members that made up the pre-18th-Congress Politburo, the highest ruling body of the CCP, only five (the so-called princelings) came from privileged backgrounds. The other 20, including the president, Hu, and the premier, Wen Jiabao, came from middle- or lower-class backgrounds. In the CCP's larger Central Committee, which was made up of more than 300 people, the percentage of people born into wealth and power was even smaller. The vast majority of those in government worked and competed their way through the ranks to the top. Admittedly, the new general secretary, Xi, is the son of a previous party leader. However, an overwhelming number of those who moved up the ranks this past fall had humbler beginnings.

So how does China ensure meritocracy? At the heart of the story is a powerful institution that is seldom studied in the West, the Organization Department of the CCP. This department carries out an elaborate process of bureaucratic selection, evaluation, and promotion that would be the envy of any corporation. Patronage continues to play a role, but by and large, merit determines who will rise through the ranks.

Every year, the government and its affiliated organizations recruit university graduates into entry-level positions in one of the three state-controlled systems: the civil service, state-owned enterprises, and government-affiliated social organizations such as universities or community programs. Most new recruits enter at the lowest level, or ke yuan. After a few years, the Organization Department reviews their performance and can promote them up through four increasingly elite managerial ranks: fu ke, ke, fu chu, and chu. The range of positions at these levels is wide, covering anything from running the health-care system in a poor village to attracting commercial investment in a city district. Once a year, the Organization Department reviews quantitative performance records for each official in each of these grades; carries out interviews with superiors, peers, and subordinates; and vets personal conduct. Extensive and frequent public opinion surveys are also conducted on questions ranging from satisfaction with the country's general direction to opinions about more mundane and specific local policies. Once the department has gathered a complete dossier on all the candidates, and has confirmed the public's general satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their performances, committees discuss the data and promote winners.

After this stage, public employees' paths diverge, and individuals can be rotated through and out of all three tracks (the civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations). An official might start out working on economic policy and then move to a job dealing with political or social issues. He or she could go from a traditional government position to a managerial role in a state-owned enterprise or a university. In many cases, the Organization Department will also send a large number of promising officials abroad to learn best practices around the world. The likes of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and the National University of Singapore regularly host Chinese officials in their training programs.

Over time, the most successful workers are promoted again, to what are known as the fu ju and ju levels, at which point a typical assignment is to manage districts with populations in the millions or companies with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues. To get a sense of how rigorous the selection process is, in 2012, there were 900,000 officials at the fu ke and ke levels and 600,000 at the fu chu and chu levels. There were only 40,000 at the fu ju and ju levels.

After the ju level, a very talented few move up several more ranks and eventually make it to the party's Central Committee. The entire process could take two to three decades, and most of those who make it to the top have had managerial experience in just about every sector of Chinese society. Indeed, of the 25 Politburo members before the 18th Party Congress, 19 had run provinces larger than most countries in the world and ministries with budgets higher than that of the average nation's government. A person with Barack Obama's pre-presidential professional experience would not even be the manager of a small county in China's system.

Xi's career path is illustrative. Over the course of 30 years, Xi rose from being a fu ke level deputy county chief in a poor village to party secretary of Shanghai and a member of the Politburo. By the time he made it to the top, Xi had already managed areas with total populations of over 150 million and combined GDPs of more than $1.5 trillion. His career demonstrates that meritocracy drives Chinese politics and that those who end up leading the country have proven records.

INNOVATE OR STAGNATE

China's centralized meritocracy also fosters government entrepreneurship. The practice of conducting top-down policy experiments in select locales and expanding the successful ones nationwide is well documented. The best-known example is Deng's creation of "special economic zones" in the 1980s. The first such zone was in Shenzhen. The district was encouraged to operate under market principles rather than the dictates of central planners. Shenzhen's economy grew rapidly, which prompted the central government to replicate the program in the cities of Zhuhai and Shantou, in Guangdong Province; Xiamen, in Fujian Province; and throughout Hainan Province.

There are also thousands of policy experiments that rise up from the local level. The competitive government job market gives capable local officials incentives to take risks and differentiate themselves from the pack. Among the 2,326 party representatives who attended the 18th Party Congress, one such standout was Qiu He, who is vice party secretary of Yunnan Province. At the congress, Qiu was selected as an alternate member of the Central Committee, putting the 55-year-old maverick near the top of the nation's political establishment. Qiu is the ultimate political entrepreneur. Born into poverty in rural China, Qiu watched two of his eight siblings die of childhood illness and malnutrition. After taking the national college entrance exam, China's great equalizer, he was able to attend university. When he entered the work force, he held several low-level civil service jobs before being appointed party secretary of Shuyang County, in northern Jiangsu Province, in the 1990s. With a peasant population of 1.7 million and an annual per capita GDP of only $250 (less than one-fifth the national average), Shuyang was one of the poorest rural areas in the country. The county also suffered from the worst crime rate in the region and endemic government corruption.

Qiu carried out a broad range of risky and controversial policy experiments that, if they failed, would have sunk his political career. His first focus was Shuyang's floundering economy. In 1997, Qiu initiated a mandatory municipal bond purchase program. The policy required every county resident to purchase bonds to fund much-needed infrastructure development. The genius of the plan was twofold. First, he could not have raised the funds through taxes because, at his level, he had no taxation authority. Second, the mandatory bond program offered the citizens of Shuyang something taxes would not have: yes, they were required to buy the bonds, but they eventually got their money back, with interest. Qiu also assigned quotas to almost every county government official for attracting commercial investments. To support their efforts, in addition to building up the area's infrastructure, Qiu offered favorable tax rates and cheap land concessions to businesses. In just a few years, thousands of private enterprises sprang up and transformed a dormant, centrally planned rural community into a vibrant market economy.

Qiu's second focus was combating corruption and mistrust between the population and the government. In the late 1990s, he instituted two unprecedented measures to make the selection of officials more open and competitive. One was to post upcoming official appointments in advance of the final decisions to allow for a public comment period. The other was the introduction of a two-tier voting system that enabled villagers to vote among party members for their preferred candidates for certain positions. The local party committee then picked between the top two vote getters.

Qiu initially met tremendous resistance from the local bureaucracy and population. But today, he is credited with turning one of the country's most backward regions into a vibrant urban center of commerce and manufacturing. Other poor regions have adopted many of his economic policy experiments. Moreover, the public commenting period has been widely adopted across China. Competitive voting is finding its way into ever-higher levels of the party hierarchy. Qiu has been personally rewarded, too, moving rapidly up the ladder: to vice governor of Jiangsu Province, mayor of Kunmin, vice party secretary of Yunnan Province, and now an alternate member of the Central Committee.

Even if critics accept that the Chinese government is adaptable and meritocratic, they still question its legitimacy. Westerners assume that multiparty elections are the only source of political legitimacy. Because China does not hold such elections, they argue, the CCP's rule rests on inherently shaky ground. Following this logic, critics have predicted the party's collapse for decades, but no collapse has come. The most recent version of the argument is that the CCP has maintained its hold on power only because it has delivered economic growth -- so-called performance legitimacy.

No doubt, performance is a major source of the party's popularity. In a poll of Chinese attitudes published by the Pew Research Center in 2011, 87 percent of respondents noted satisfaction with the general direction of the country, 66 percent reported significant progress in their lives in the past five years, and a whopping 74 percent said they expected the future to be even better. Performance legitimacy, however, is only one source of the party's popular support. Much more significant is the role of Chinese nationalism and moral legitimacy.

When the CCP built the Monument to the People's Heroes at the center of Tiananmen Square in 1949, it included a frieze depicting the struggles of the Chinese to establish the People's Republic. One would expect the CCP, a Marxist-Leninist party, to have its most symbolic political narrative begin with communism -- the writing of The Communist Manifesto, for example, or perhaps the birth of the CCP in 1921. Instead, the first carving of the frieze depicts an event from 1839: the public burning of imported opium by the Qing dynasty's imperial minister, Lin Zexu, which triggered the first Opium War. China's subsequent loss to the British inaugurated the so-called century of humiliation. In the following hundred years, China suffered countless invasions, wars, and famines -- all, in the popular telling, to reach 1949. And today, the Monument to the People's Heroes remains a sacred public site and the most significant symbol of the CCP's national moral authority.

The CCP's role in saving and modernizing China is a far more durable source of its legitimacy than the country's economic performance. It explains why, even at the worst times of the party's rule in the past 63 years, including the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the CCP was able to keep the support of mainstream Chinese long enough for it to correct its mistakes. China's recent achievements, from economic growth to space exploration, are only strengthening nationalist sentiments in the country, especially among the youth. The party can count on their support for decades to come.

A final type of staying power comes from repression, which China watchers in the West claim is the real force behind the CCP. They point to censorship and the regime's harsh treatment of dissidents, which undoubtedly exist. Still, the party knows very well that general repression is not sustainable. Instead, it seeks to employ smart containment. The strategy is to give the vast majority of people the widest range possible of personal liberties. And today, Chinese people are freer than at any other period in recent memory; most of them can live where they want and work as they choose, go into business without hindrance, travel within and out of the country, and openly criticize the government online without retaliation. Meanwhile, state power focuses on containing a small number of individuals who have political agendas and want to topple the one-party system. As any casual observer would know, over the last ten years, the quantity of criticism against the government online and in print has increased exponentially -- without any reprisals. Every year, there are tens of thousands of local protests against specific policies. Most of the disputes are resolved peacefully. But the government deals forcefully with the very few who aim to subvert China's political system, such as Liu Xiaobo, an activist who calls for the end of single-party rule and who is currently in jail.

That is not to say that there aren't problems. Corruption, for one, could seriously harm the CCP's reputation. But it will not derail party rule anytime soon. Far from being a problem inherent to the Chinese political system, corruption is largely a byproduct of the country's rapid transformation. When the United States was going through its industrialization 150 years ago, violence, the wealth gap, and corruption in the country were just as bad as, if not worse than, in China today. According to Transparency International, China ranks 75th in global corruption and is gradually getting better. It is less corrupt than Greece (80th), India (95th), Indonesia and Argentina (tied at 100th), and the Philippines (129th) -- all of which are electoral democracies. Understood in such a context, the Chinese government's corruption is by no means insurmountable. And the party's deeply rooted popular support will allow it the breathing room to grapple with even the toughest problems.

ENTER THE DRAGON

China's new leaders will govern the country for the next ten years, during which they will rely on the CCP's adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy to tackle major challenges. The current economic slowdown is worrying, but it is largely cyclical, not structural. Two forces will reinvigorate the economy for at least another generation: urbanization and entrepreneurship. In 1990, only about 25 percent of Chinese lived in cities. Today, 51 percent do. Before 2040, a full 75 percent -- nearly one billion people -- are expected to be urban. The amount of new roads, housing, utilities, and communications infrastructure needed to accommodate this expansion is astounding. Therefore, any apparent infrastructure or housing bubbles will be momentary. In fact, China's new leadership will need to continue or even increase investment in these sectors in the years to come. That investment and the vast new urban work force, with all its production and consumption, will drive high economic growth rates. The party's extraordinary ability to develop and execute policy and its political authority will help it manage these processes.

Meanwhile, entrepreneurship will help China overcome threats to its export-fueled economic model. Externally, the global economic downturn and a rising currency value have dampened Chinese trade. Internally, labor costs have risen in the country's coastal manufacturing regions. But the market will sort out these problems. After all, China's economic miracle was not just a centrally planned phenomenon. Beijing facilitated the development of a powerful market economy, but private entrepreneurs are the lifeblood of the system. And these entrepreneurs are highly adaptive. Already, some low-end manufacturing has moved inland to contain labor costs. This is coinciding with local governments' aggressive infrastructure investments and innovative efforts to attract new business. In the costal regions, many companies are producing increasingly-higher-value goods.

Of course, the government will need to make some economic adjustments. For one, many state-owned enterprises have grown too big, crowding out the private-sector growth that is critical to economic vitality. Plans to require companies to pay out dividends to shareholders and other limits on expansion are already in the works. These will likely be implemented early on in the new administration. And some stalled measures encouraging financial liberalization, such as allowing the market to determine interest rates and the development of private small and medium-sized lending institutions, which would break the large state-owned banks' near monopoly in commercial lending, are likely to get picked up. These reforms would facilitate more efficient flows of capital to businesses.

Economic liberalization will likely be matched by a two-track reform of social policy. First, the process of making the party more inclusive, which began with Jiang's inclusion of businesspeople in the CCP, will be accelerated. Second, the CCP will begin experimenting with outsourcing certain social welfare functions to approved nongovernmental organizations. Rapid urbanization is facilitating the growth of a large middle-income society. Instead of demanding abstract political rights, as many in the West expected, urban Chinese are focused on what are called min sheng (livelihood) issues. The party may not be able to manage these concerns alone. And so private businesses or nongovernmental organizations might be called in to provide health care and education in the cities, which has already started to happen in Guangdong Province.

Corruption remains the hardest nut to crack. In recent years, family members of some party leaders have used their political influence to build up large networks of commercial interests. Cronyism is spreading from the top down, which could eventually threaten the party's rule. The CCP has articulated a three-pronged strategy to attack the problem, which the new leadership will carry out. The most important institution for containing corruption is the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Its leader usually sits on the Standing Committee of the Politburo and has more power than the state judiciary. This person can detain and interrogate party members suspected of corruption without legal limits. In recent years, the commission has been very aggressive. In 2011, it conducted formal investigations into 137,859 cases that resulted in disciplinary actions or legal convictions against party officials. This number represents a nearly fourfold increase since the years before 1989, when corruption was one of the main issues that drove the Tiananmen protests. One sign to watch in the next administration is whether the commission is authorized to investigate wrongdoing within the inner sanctum of the party leadership, where corruption can be the most detrimental to the party's credibility.

Complementing the party's own antigraft efforts is the increasing independence of media outlets, both state- and privately owned. News organizations have already exposed cases of official corruption and disseminated their findings on the Internet. The CCP has responded by pursuing some of the cases that the media have brought to light. Of course, this system is not perfect, and some media outlets are themselves corrupt. Illicit payments to journalists and fabricated stories are commonplace. If these problems are not corrected quickly, Chinese media will lose what little credibility they have gained.

Accordingly, the next administration might develop more sophisticated political regulations and legal constraints on journalists to provide space for the sector to mature. Officials have already discussed instituting a press law that would protect legitimate, factual reporting and penalize acts of libel and misrepresentation. Some might view the initiative as the government reining in journalists, but the larger impact would be to make the media more credible in the eyes of the Chinese public. Journalists who take bribes or invent rumors to attract readers can hardly check government corruption.

Also to tackle corruption, the party plans to increase open competition within its own ranks, inspired by the efforts of officials such as Qiu. The hope is that such competition will air dirty laundry and discourage unseemly behavior. The Hu administration initiated an "intraparty democracy" program to facilitate direct competition for seats on party committees, an idea that received high praise at the 18th Congress.

HISTORY'S RESTART

Should the 18th Party Congress' initiatives succeed, 2012 might one day be seen as marking the end of the idea that electoral democracy is the only legitimate and effective system of political governance. While China's might grows, the West's ills multiply: since winning the Cold War, the United States has, in one generation, allowed its middle class to disintegrate. Its infrastructure languishes in disrepair, and its politics, both electoral and legislative, have fallen captive to money and special interests. Its future generations will be so heavily indebted that a sustained decline in average living standards is all but certain. In Europe, too, monumental political, economic, and social distress has caused the European project to run aground. Meanwhile, during the same period, China has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and is now a leading industrial powerhouse.

The West's woes are self-inflicted. Claims that Western electoral systems are infallible have hampered self-correction. Elections are seen as ends in themselves, not merely means to good governance. Instead of producing capable leaders, electoral politics have made it very difficult for good leaders to gain power. And in the few cases when they do, they are paralyzed by their own political and legal systems. As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travels around the world extolling electoral democracy, the legitimacy of nearly all U.S. political institutions is crumbling. The approval rating of the U.S. Congress among the American people stood at 18 percent in November. The president was performing somewhat better, with ratings in the 50s. And even support for the politically independent Supreme Court had fallen below 50 percent.

Many developing countries have already come to learn that democracy doesn't solve all their problems. For them, China's example is important. Its recent success and the failures of the West offer a stark contrast. To be sure, China's political model will never supplant electoral democracy because, unlike the latter, it does not pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But its success does show that many systems of political governance can work when they are congruent with a country's culture and history. The significance of China's success, then, is not that China provides the world with an alternative but that it demonstrates that successful alternatives exist. Twenty-four years ago, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama predicted that all countries would eventually adopt liberal democracy and lamented that the world would become a boring place because of that. Relief is on the way. A more interesting age may be upon us. 

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"Reprinted by permission of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (January/February 2013). Copyright 2013 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. (www.ForeignAffairs.com)