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2013年11月，中國共產黨十八屆三中全會在北京召開。中國的領導權力交接一般在黨的全國代表大會上完成，而新班子的施政藍圖則在三中全會上勾勒，其影響有時超過一代人。眾所周知，1978年底，正是在十一屆三中全會上，鄧小平啟動了歷史性的經濟改革。那屆三中全會改變了中國的命運，甚至影響到了今天的世界格局。30多年后，中國已躍居世界第二大經濟體，是當今世界公認的崛起中的大國。2012年，中共十八大完成領導層交接，而三中全會則呈現習近平總書記及其同事將如何謀篇布局，令全世界矚目。

本屆三中全會通過的經濟改革決議內容非常豐富，吸引了大部分的注意力。已公布的新經濟政策出乎大部分人的預期，僅舉幾項足以深刻影響中國經濟結構的新政，比如推廣國有企業的混合所有制，減少對企業的行政管制，改善有關農民、土地的管理、流轉措施，促進金融領域市場化。如果這些舉措能在相當程度上落實，中國經濟無疑將再次迎來持續增長的新時代。

然而，主流輿論的評價依舊是，中國的新領導集體沿襲了先前的改革路徑，即經濟改革步伐很大，而備受期待的政治改革卻停滯不前，甚至有所倒退。毋庸置疑，本屆三中全會加強了中共在中國政治體制內的領導地位。因此，有些人斷言新領導集體在走“政左經右”的老套路。

但這種觀點是偏執的誤讀。事實上，三中全會啟動了許多關鍵的，甚至是劃時代的政治改革。這些改革將根本上改變這個世界人口最多的國家的治理模式。

至少在以下三大重要領域，制度性的改革已經展開。具體而言，包括：一、重新調整中央與地方的關系；二、劃時代地革新黨和國家的紀檢司法制度；三、建國以來最大幅度重組最高領導層的決策機制，與時俱進，重新定義黨政關系。

財政預算改革

中央與地方的關系一直是中國政治的難題，幾千年來一直困擾著中華帝國。這一對關系處理得當與否，直接關乎社稷興亡。處理得當，則國泰民安；反之，則內亂頻仍，甚至導致皇朝的衰落和滅亡。

當代中國也不例外。建國64年來，在中央與地方關系上，中共至少經歷了三個階段的探索：第一階段是1949年至1956年，當時為了鞏固新生的共和國，恢復滿目瘡痍的國民經濟，中國引進蘇聯體制，將幾乎一切權力收歸中央；但在第二階段，也就是50年代末開始，新中國的締造者毛澤東反思蘇聯體制，在相當長時間里推動了權力下放的改革。這一大膽探索的理論思考，集中體現于1956年毛澤東論述治國方針的重要著作《論十大關系》。在其中，毛澤東主張將權力大幅從中央下放到省和基層。毛澤東闡述，權力下放有利于解放生產力，調動地方的政治積極性。這一權力下放變革在“文化大革命”結束時的70年代末達到高峰，包括征稅、國企管理甚至軍隊工作都移交到地方。這一趨勢一直延續到改革開放初期，在80年代，中央政府多次陷入財政困境，不得不向各省“化緣”。很多人將毛澤東視為集權主義者，這一觀點其實是過于簡單化的。

直到90年代初，中國才開始重新調整中央與地方的關系。1994年，朱镕基啟動分稅制改革，充實中央財政。然而，近30年放權讓利的趨勢積重難返。截止到十八屆三中全會前，中央政府的年稅收收入達20萬億元，但僅有一半列入財政預算。三中全會宣布，中國將完善國家財政制度，統一收入和支出，這無疑切準了幾十年來中央與地方關系的核心。這項改革完成后，中央控制支出的能力將大大增加；央地間的權責關系將更加明晰；轉移支付管理將進一步標準化；地方債的監督管理將歸總到中央部委。

未來十年，這些改革將強勁推動中國的全方位發展。稅收管理系統和地方債務控制機制的改革，將糾正過度追求短期和局部經濟目標導致的資源配置不合理。央地關系調整后，中央將會立足于全國高度，對國家長期發展戰略進行布局。城市化無疑是重中之重。中國計劃在未來20年里，以年均1300萬人的速度推動城市化。在此前的發展模式中，城鄉差距越拉越大，和進城農民工邊緣化等問題久拖不決。隨著中央財政支出能力增強，政府將會改善資源配置方式，增加醫療、福利、教育等公共品的供給。中國要在下一階段實現其雄心勃勃的城市化目標，這些改革是極為必要的。

三中全會決議中最受關注的一項政策表述，是發揮市場在資源配置中的決定性作用。一些人認為，這一改革目標可能與央地關系調整中中央權力加強的導向矛盾。這種分析不符合事實。30多年來，相對分散放權的制度環境促進了經濟發展，也導致了商業競爭中地方保護主義盛行和制度化規則缺失，這無疑妨礙了市場經濟的深化發展。許多企業利用與地方政府的特殊關系，設置行政壁壘，阻礙其它地區的競爭者進入。許多企業赴外地發展時，都會遭遇規章、管理上的重重障礙。正如美國工業化時期聯邦權力的不斷加強促進了國內貿易，三中全會啟動的改革也將提高中國市場經濟的活力并擴大其規模效應。除此之外，這一改革還會帶來許多外部收益。比如，全國范圍內統一標準、改進規章、加強監管，將極大地促進環境保護和食品安全。

紀檢司法改革

腐敗泛濫是當前中國政府治理面臨的主要挑戰。很多人斷言，盡管中國模式在其他領域的成績稱得上無可否認，但終究克服不了腐敗這個阿喀琉斯之踵。近年來中共難以遏制腐敗的主要原因之一是，黨和政府的紀檢司法制度存在根本性缺陷。

中共自從誕生起，就十分注重對黨內權力濫用的監督。1927年，早在獲得政權22年前，即正式成立僅6年后，中共就建立了第一個黨內監督機構——中央監察委員會。在建國后64年的革命和執政過程中，黨內監督機構的作用歷經波折，到“文革”時期已完全失效。在1978年的十一屆三中全會上，鄧小平領導重建黨內監督機構，即中央紀律檢查委員會。

從1927年起，中共沿用了源自蘇共的矩陣式結構的黨內監督制度。名義上，各級紀委在工作上都受其上級指導，且中紀委是最高的指導機構。但實際運行中，紀委在組織和工作上，都無法獨立于同級黨委。比如，在一個縣里，最大的官員就是縣委書記；縣紀委書記也是縣委常委，但其黨內地位和級別卻低于主持常委會工作的縣委書記。進而言之，在人事、財政、工資、福利上，各級紀委莫不受控于同級黨委。這就會引發許多困境，紀檢官員必須監督比自己威望和權力大得多、甚至還能決定他仕途的領導。在政府結構相對簡單時，這一缺陷尚不明顯，但隨著政治、社會結構高度發展且日漸復雜，上述結構性缺陷就足以損害黨的執政能力。

重慶市委書記薄熙來在落馬前，是中國最高決策層中央政治局的成員；但重慶市紀委書記，卻連中央委員都不是，黨內地位和權力與薄熙來相去甚遠。因此毫不奇怪，紀委能懲戒較低級別的腐敗分子，但對同級或更高級的違法分子就無能為力了。

三中全會對黨內監督制度進行了劃時代的改革。中共總結了近60年來紀檢工作的經驗，加強了紀委的垂直領導，使各級紀委決策權獨立于同級黨委。經過改革，各級紀委仍屬同級黨委成員，但在執行監督職能時獨立決策。每一級紀委接受上一級紀委的直接指導，最后在管理上都歸口到中央紀委。中央紀委獲得了對全國各級紀檢官員的人事權。各級紀委在立案查案時，將不受同級黨委干預，對上級紀委負責。就在三中全會結束之際，中央紀委從北京向上海空降了一位紀委書記，這或許是在傳遞一個政治信號。

與中共黨內監督制度的改革相對照，政府層面的司法改革也體現了同樣的精神。各級法院將接受上級法院的指導，更少受同級政府的干預。下一步改革方向可能是設立跨行政區劃的法院，以進一步減少來自地方政府的影響。

上述改革對中國未來治理的影響不可低估。這是幾十年來中共對政治體制內權力分配的最大調整。中國是個幅員遼闊的大國，治理模式十分復雜。在各級政府中設立獨立的監督機構，是一項巨大的變革。如果這一舉措得到有效落實，將在相當程度上遏制腐敗并改善政府治理能力。

本文發表于最新一期《外交》雜志（《Foreign Affairs》）及其網站，觀察者網首發中文全文

黨政關系改革

三中全會最引人注目的改革舉措，是國家安全委員會和全面深化改革領導小組的設立。這兩個機構都接受中央政治局以及其常委會的直接領導，這也就意味著其地位高于國務院，后者相當于西方國家的內閣。要理解這一舉措的重要意義，首先要回溯一下建國以來的歷史沿革。

1949年中華人民共和國成立時，從蘇聯引進了“三駕馬車”的政治模式。在蘇聯，“三駕馬車”是指蘇共中央委員會、最高蘇維埃、部長會議；與此相對應，中共在已有的中共中央委員會之外，又設立了全國人民代表大會和國務院。其中，全國人大是由其委員長領導下的立法機關，而國務院則是政府總理管理下的內閣，而人大委員長和政府總理又都是政治局常委。近二十年來，黨的總書記也擔任國家主席，也就是國家的元首。在形式上，“三駕馬車”是并駕齊驅的，但中國憲法同時賦予中共最高領導地位。

由此可見，“三駕馬車”在制度上導致疊床架屋，在政治上也有其不確定性。在黨和政府的關系中，這一問題往往特別敏感。建國以后，關于究竟應該“黨政合一”還是“黨政分開”， 多次引發爭論。在建國以后第一個三十年，毛澤東在到底是只做黨的主席，放手讓政府獨立作為，還是干脆走上前臺，黨政軍一把抓的問題上，反復權衡，一直舉棋不定。“三駕馬車”模式潛伏的制度性矛盾，以及當時多位建國領導人的特殊性格和地位，正是“文革”浩劫爆發的原因之一。

不論在憲法還是政治實踐中，中共中央都是中國的最高決策機構。然而，“三駕馬車”模式導致了形式上的權力分化。這種理論上的模糊，已成為中國政治發展的一大障礙。本屆三中全會決定設立國家安全委員會和全面深化改革領導小組，為最終破除蘇聯政治模式的缺陷邁出了關鍵一步。通過加強憲法賦予的領導地位，中共正決然地走到政治領導的中心和前沿。國家安全委員會領導幾乎一切攸關國內外安全問題的事務，從公安部到外交部皆涵蓋其中。全面深化改革領導小組則聚焦于中國最重大的經濟決策。這兩大關鍵決策機構，都受中央政治局直接領導。事實上，中國的體制在一定程度上，已接近于法國等國采用的半總統制。

國家安全委員會和全面深化改革領導小組的設立，將使中國在政治制度上更加“名實相符”，更有利于政治穩定。這項改革同時也啟動了一項政治理念上的突破。不應忽視的是，現代政黨的概念，是一百多年前從西方輸入中國的，但中共與西方國家的政黨有本質區別。在西方，民族國家首先出現，然后政黨作為一部分(parts)社會群體的代表登上政治舞臺，這正是政黨(party)的字面含義。但在中國，歷史進程與西方恰好截然相反。中共在1921年成立，28年后，創建了中華人民共和國。從成立第一天開始，中共的政治觀就是代表中國多階層民眾的利益。在革命時期和建國初期，中共主要以馬列主義的階級觀為思想核心，把自己定位為無產階級的先鋒隊。

隨著中共在政治探索和執政實踐中日漸成熟，其基因中的民族國家因素逐漸成了主流。對這一演變，十多年前，江澤民總書記予以總結并提出了“三個代表”理論。由此，中共與時俱進，發展包括民營企業家在內的新生力量入黨，以充分代表中國社會的各個階層和群體。在政治功能上，中共顯然不同于西方的政黨，而是更近似于全國性的文官共同體，正如中國歷朝歷代的文官士大夫共同體一樣。中共宣布自己代表中華民族，而不是特定階層或群體；作為一個執政組織，中共根據選賢任能的原則從全社會選拔人才。本屆三中全會的改革，宣告中國正式擺脫了蘇聯式的“三駕馬車”模式的影響，將黨和政府在結構上融為一體 。這一改革是一次歷史性跨越，標志著中共成功地將現代化導向和中國獨特的文化遺產相融合，引領國家的政治制度走向日益成熟。

當下，世界上許多國家在政治上實行多黨制，即政黨作為不同利益集團的代表，通過競選輪流坐莊。就歷史趨勢看，中國的治理模式很可能截然不同。中共正在發展為代表中國社會整體利益的執政組織，它與中國歷朝歷代的士大夫文官共同體有相似之處，然而其本質已經現代化。中國政治發展的未來，將取決于中共這一核心政治體制在制度上與時俱進，適應日新月異的中國社會的能力。

三中全會開啟第三個三十年

在國內外的輿論中，“政治改革”一詞基本被意識形態偏見所綁架。在這種語境中，“政治改革”被等同于西方式的民主化。不管多重大的變革，只要不是朝著多黨競爭的選舉制方向發展，就不會被承認是“政治改革”。這種觀點不但膚淺，而且不利于世界了解中國。

很多人割裂中共領導中國的歷史，聲稱中共64年的執政史可分為正反兩個三十年，其中從1949年到1979年的前三十年，主要領導人是毛澤東；從1979年直到當下的后三十年，以鄧小平的改革為起點。很多人認為，后三十年是對前三十年的背離甚至否定。但這是誤讀，盡管前三十年和后三十年在意識形態表達上對比鮮明，但在歷史脈絡上卻是緊密相聯的。正是在毛澤東領導的前三十年中，中國獲得了民族獨立，奇跡般地完成了工業和人力資源的基本積累，奠定了現代國家的基礎。沒有前三十年的積累，后三十年的改革開放便無法成功實施。

如果上述政治改革獲得落實，十八屆三中全會將成為第三個三十年的起點，并開創一個新的時代。未來的三十年將是以改革開放為節點的前兩個三十年的辯證結合，以構成現代中國完整、獨特的歷史敘述。一個全新的現代政治模式正在成形，它不同于基于選舉和多黨輪替的西方式現代性民主，然而它的執政能力、靈活性、反饋民意的有效性、和權力制約的創新性將超越正落后于時代的現代性。

當下，治理危機正在全球潰瘍。美國的兩黨惡性對立導致治理癱瘓，歐洲的精英官僚主義壓制下的歐盟各國民眾怨聲載道，發達國家在政爭泥潭中越陷越深，難以自拔。在許多發展中國家，從泰國到埃及，選舉民主制陷入四面楚歌。

盡管面臨無數挑戰和考驗，中國在發展經濟、消除貧困、凝聚社會等許多領域的成就出類拔萃。在習近平總書記的任期內，中國將問鼎世界第一經濟大國地位。在目前的發展勢頭下，到本世紀中葉，中國將在綜合國力的各個方面成為真正的世界大國。中國從古老的文明中走來，其現代化的道路將為世界帶來全新的視野和可能性。然而，如果中國找不到成熟穩定、適合國情的政治治理模式，上述潛力就只能是鏡花水月。三中全會在政治治理上啟動了大膽改革，其落實將為未來中國提供穩定的政治保障，為這個古老文明的復興鋪平道路。2013年11月，在北京召開的十八屆三中全會，對世界的未來影響深遠。

李世默是上海的風險投資家和政治學學者。

本文發表于最新一期《外交》雜志（《Foreign Affairs》），觀察者網首發中文全文，點擊下一頁查看英文原文

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《外交》雜志（《Foreign Affairs》）網站1月11日首頁截圖

PARTY OF THE CENTURY

THE THIRD PLENUM BEGINS THE THIRD THIRTY-YEARS

By: Eric X. Li

In November 2013, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its much-anticipated Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Congress (the Third Plenum). Each third plenum usually sets the policy agenda for a new administration. Some project much longer-term impacts. More than 30 years ago, Deng Xiaoping famously launched his ground breaking economic reforms at the third plenum of the party’s eleventh congress. That meeting changed the trajectory of China and the world at large. After the transfer of power to a new generation of leaders at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012, this Third Plenum offers the world the most concrete look at how General Secretary Xi Jinping plans to lead the world’s most significant ascending power.

Most analyses have focused on the wide-ranging economic reform agenda. To be sure, the economic policy measures announced are more sweeping than most people expected and, if implemented to any significant extent, are likely to usher in yet another era of sustained economic growth. They include initiatives that will drastically change the structure of the Chinese economy, such as hybrid ownership of state companies, reduced regulatory hurdles for commercial enterprises, greater control and transferability of land for rural residents, and liberalization of the financial sector, to name just a few.

Yet, the common narrative is that, just like reformers in the past, China’s new leadership has put forth substantial economic reforms but, again, held its ground, or even backtracked, on much hoped for political reforms. It is true that the centrality of the party’s leadership has been strengthened, not loosened. As a result, some have characterized it as “turning right on economics and left on politics”.

But such views are misplaced. The Third Plenum has launched significant, and in some cases unprecedented, political reforms that will fundamentally alter how the world’s largest nation is governed.

These institutional reformulations are taking place in three critical dimensions: substantial re-engineering of the relationship between central and local authorities, unprecedented restructuring of the party’s disciplinary inspection regime and the state’s legal system, and the most significant reorganization at the highest level of decision-making mechanism in the history of the People’s Republic that will redefine the relationship between the party and the state.

REBALANCING ACT

For centuries, one of the most vexing political problems of imperial China was the balance of power between central and local authorities. Many successes and failures of governance were direct results of how this relationship was managed. A healthy balance underwrote long periods of prosperity and stability. The opposite led to coups and counter-coups and sometimes the demise of dynasties.

Contemporary China is no exception. In its 64-year history, the party’s governance model in terms of central and local relations has gone through at least three phases. The first was Soviet-styled centralization between 1949 and 1956. Driven by the need to consolidate the newly established political power and resuscitate a long paralyzed and disparate economy, the party imported the model from the Soviet Union in which virtually all powers were centralized in Beijing. However, beginning in the late 1950’s, China’s founding leader Mao Zedong changed course and led the nation through a long period of devolution of power. He launched this dramatic turn-around with the publication of one of his most important treatises on Chinese governance, “On the Ten Imperative Relations”, in 1956. In it, Mao proposed an across-the-board decentralization of power from Beijing to provincial and local governments. According to him, such devolution was urgently needed to release the productive forces of the economy and revitalize local political initiative. This process intensified through the end of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970’s when tax collection, control of state owned enterprises, and even the management structure of the military were devolved to regional levels. The remnants of that period continued in the first phase of Deng Xiaoping’s reform era. In the eighties, the central government was at times so strapped for cash that it had to demand financial support from provincial capitals. Many characterize Mao as the ultimate centralizer of political power. Such views are gross over-simplifications.

It was not until the early 1990’s when the party began to rebalance this critical relationship between the central and the regional. Former Premier Zhu Rongji formalized this process in 1994 by shifting taxing authority back to Beijing. However, nearly three decades of decentralization was difficult to reverse. By the time of the Third Plenum, only half of the central government’s 20 trillion RMB annual tax collection was under the fiscal budget. The single standardized national budget that would unify revenue and spending announced in the Third Plenum is a most impactful re-engineering of the core of Chinese political governance in decades. Under this new system, the central government will assume nearly full authority on national spending. Administrative responsibilities are to be clearly delineated between Beijing and regional and local governments. Rules on transfer payments will be standardized. Direct monitoring and management of local government debts are now vested in central government ministries.

In the coming decade, many of these changes will prove critical to China’s long-term development blueprint. The new tax revenue management system and debt control mechanism will address the issues arisen from misallocation of resources driven by short-term and localized economic targets. With this rebalancing of power, the central government is now able to implement policies on a nationwide basis in pursuit of cross-generational national strategies. Urbanization tops the list. China plans to urbanize 13 million people a year over the next 20 years. The rural-urban divide and the large newly urbanized migrant population in limbo have long been persistent problems in China’s development model. By doubling its control over the purse string, Beijing will be able to manage allocation of national resources to expand the provision of public goods such as healthcare, welfare, and education that are pre-requisites for realizing the aggressive urbanization goals for the next phase.

The most widely reported item put forth at the Third Plenum was the principle that the market should be allowed to exercise a decisive force in the allocation of economic resources. Some have said that the rebalancing of political power to the center runs counter to that stated goal. But this assessment is contrary to realities on the ground. After more than thirty years of rapid economic development under a relatively decentralized framework, local protectionism and the lack of standardized rules that govern commercial activities are now hampering the further development of China’s market economy. Many companies use their alliances with local governments to block entry by competitors from other regions by political means. Disparate rules and regulations across provinces make it difficult for companies to operate outside their home territories. The centralization policies launched by the Third Plenum, not dissimilar to the waves of federalization during America’s industrialization process that propelled inter-state commerce, will drive the further scaling up of China’s vibrant market economy. In addition, positive externalities may also result from this trend. Environmental protection and food safety, for examples, will greatly benefit from the national standardization and enforcement of rules and regulations.

DISCIPLINE AND THE LAW

Widespread official corruption is a major challenge facing contemporary China’s political governance. Many have named corruption as the Achilles’ heel of a political system that has otherwise achieved undeniable successes. One of the main reasons for the party’s inability to contain corruption has been the existence of fundamental flaws in the intra-party discipline inspection regime and the state’s legal system.

How to check internal abuse of power has been a central issue for the CCP at the earliest stage of its development. The first internal inspection agency, then called the Central Inspection Commission, was established in 1927 when the party was barely six years old and 22 years before it actually gained political power. The system has gone through periods of irrelevance and effectiveness. It fell to virtual disuse during the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping re-established the current incarnation of the regime, called Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), at the all-important third plenum of the eleventh party congress in 1978.

From its origin in 1927 to the present, the party used the matrix structure borrowed from the Soviet Communist Party’s internal inspection organization. In name, the Discipline Inspection Commission (DIC) at each level of government is under the DIC of the next highest level of government, and ultimately all under the CDIC. But in practice, they are appointed by and work under the party committee of the same level. For instance, the highest official of a county is the county party committee secretary. The head of the Discipline Inspection Commission of the county serves on that party committee under the authority of the party secretary and is almost always of a lower rank to him in the party’s hierarchy. Further more, almost all personnel, financial management, compensation and welfare of each DIC are controlled by the parallel party committee. This leads to the situation in which the person in charge of checking official corruption in a particular jurisdiction is under the influence and authority of, and sometimes owes his career to, the head of the officialdom he is tasked to discipline. This shortcoming might not have been so obvious when the governance system was relatively simple. But with the dramatic increase in the complexities of the country’s political system and its society in general this structural flaw is proving to be crippling to the party’s ability to govern.

Bo Xilai, the disgraced party secretary of Chongqing, was a member of the Politburo, China’s highest ruling body. But the head of Chongqing’s Discipline Inspection Commission was not even a member of the Central Committee, which placed him at least two levels below in ranking to Bo. Needless to say, such a regime, while workable in punishing low-level offenses, is weak in checking abuse of power at higher levels.

An unprecedented restructuring of this system occurred at the Third Plenum. The decision-making mechanism of the regime has been extracted from the nearly sixty-year-old matrix structure and remade into a vertical agency apart from the party committee composition. The Discipline Inspection Commission at each level of government remains inside the party committee system but its functions are now independent of the party committee of that jurisdiction. Each DIC is being placed under the direct control of the DIC at the next highest level of government and ultimately under the Central Discipline Inspection Commission in Beijing. The CDIC will now have full authority over appointments of officials at all DIC’s at all levels nationwide. The initiation and investigation of all cases by a DIC are to be conducted autonomously from the parallel party committee and held accountable to the next highest DIC. As if to demonstrate the immediate effect of this restructuring, at the closing of the Third Plenum Beijing appointed a new head of the Shanghai Discipline Inspection Commission, an official from the capital.

To mirror the reform of the party’s internal inspection regime, the state’s legal system is being similarly restructured. The court systems at each jurisdiction will be held accountable not to its parallel government but to the next highest court. It is widely anticipated that the system will be further reformed to establish cross-jurisdictional courts, setting it further apart from local and regional authorities.

One cannot overstate the significance of these reforms to China’s future governance. It is the most qualitative change in the distribution and provision of power for the party in decades. China is an extremely large country with a highly complex governance mechanism. The introduction of an independent authority as a watchdog at each and every level of government is a dramatic move. If fully implemented, the new system will play a decisive role in curbing corruption and generally improve the efficacy of governance.

PARTY AND STATE

The Third Plenum’s most noticeable reorganization of political structure came with the establishment of the National Security Committee (NSC) and the Central Reform Leading Group (CRLG). Both are directly under the authority of the Politburo and its standing committee and, therefore, above the State Council (equivalent of the cabinet). A review of the historical context can help understand the importance of this development.

In 1949 when the party established the People’s Republic, it borrowed what was called the “three-carriages” model from the Soviet Union. Corresponding to the USSR’s Party Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet, and the Central Ministerial Conference, the CCP, in addition to its own party central committee, set up the National People’s Congress and the State Council. The former is the legislature let by a chairman and the latter is the cabinet run by the premier who is the head of government, and both are members of the Politburo’s standing committee. In recent decades, the General Secretary of the Party also serves as president who is the head of state. The “three carriages” are parallel in form. But the Constitution enshrines the centrality of the party’ s leadership of the whole nation.

This has created a level of institutional complexities that have periodically caused uncertainties in governance. The issue has been at times particularly acute in the relationship between the party and the State Council. Ever since the early days of the People’s Republic, periodical debates broke out about the degree of integration, or separation, between the party led by the Central Committee and its Politburo and the government run by the State Council. During the first 30 years under Mao, the “great helmsman” has been driven back and forth between being only the leader of the party while leaving the government to be run by separate institutions and asserting direct control over all national powers. Such institutional conflicts, combined with the varying characteristics of the personalities involved, were partially responsible for the disastrous Cultural Revolution.

Both constitutionally and practically, the party is the supreme political institution for the nation. Yet, the “three-carriages” governing model puts up a pretense of separation. This conceptual contradiction has remained a stubborn stumbling block in China’s political development. With the creation of the National Security Committee and the Central Reform Leading Group, the Third Plenum initiated the most significant departure from the old Soviet model. The party has now moved firmly to the front and center of political governance, further cementing its constitutional authority. The NSC’s responsibilities cover all aspects of China’s domestic and international security policies from the police force to the Foreign Ministry. The CRLG will spearhead the nation’s most strategic economic initiatives. Both are now under the firm control of the party’s Politburo. In a practical sense, the Chinese system has, in some respects, moved closer to the semi-presidential system employed by countries like France.

This brings China’s institutional conception closer to reality and will serve as an immensely stabilizing force in governance. It may also signal a potential political breakthrough. It is important to note that the idea of modern political parties was imported into China from the West more than a hundred years ago. But the CCP in essence is not the same as political parties in Western countries in which the establishment of the nation state came first and the parties materialized later to represent “parts” – as the term party means – of the population in the political system. What happened in modern China was the reverse. The party came into existence first and, after 28 years, it founded the People’s Republic. From day one, the CCP claimed to represent a plurality of the Chinese nation. That claim was checked by the party’s Marxist-Leninist heritage of being the vanguard of the proletariat.

However, as the party and the nation matured, the national dimension of its DNA has been prevailing. General Secretary Jiang Zemin began the articulation of this evolution with his “Theory of the Three Represents” more than ten years ago. It began the process of making the party represent cross sections of Chinese society and have since inducted new elements, including private business people, into the party ranks. In effect, like the centuries-old Mandarin class of the Chinese dynasties, the CCP is, and behaves as such, a governing organization, not a political party. Its claim of representation is of the entirety of the Chinese nation not certain sections of it, and its ranks are open to all who are qualified by merit. By formally ending the Soviet styled “three carriages” model and structurally infusing the party and government, the Third Plenum further advanced this  process and marked an important inflection point for the party as a maturing governing institution that is both connected to China’s unique cultural heritage and unmistakably modern.

In the long run, China’s governance will likely be qualitatively different from the model currently employed by most countries in which multiple parties compete to represent different interest groups through elections. The CCP is evolving into a governing organization that would embody a plurality of Chinese society, not dissimilar to the centuries-old Mandarin class of the Chinese dynasties - although unmistakably modern. The future of Chinese political governance, then, will depend on the development of the CCP and its institutional capabilities to continue to adapt to a rapidly changing society.

THE THIRD THIRTY YEARS

When it comes to China, the term “political reform” has been ideologically hijacked. It is taken to mean Western styled democratization. Any changes that are not consistent with that end, no matter how significant, cannot be honored with the term “political reform”. Such views are immature, if not outright harmful, to the world’s understanding of China.

Many segregate the party's leadership of the largest nation in the world into two thirty-year periods: the first was between 1949 and 1979 under Mao; the second was between 1979 and now, which began with Deng's reforms. Some have characterized the second thirty-year period as a departure from or even a betrayal of the first. They are wrong. Although the first and second thirty years seemed to project starkly contrasting ideological outlooks, they are also symbiotic to each other. Without the national independence and the building of basic industrial and human infrastructures of a modern nation accomplished during the first thirty years under Mao, Deng’s reforms in the second thirty years would not have been possible.

This Third Plenum, if these political reforms are carried out, will begin a third thirty-year era that will dialectically combine the first two and bring into totality a unique modern Chinese narrative -- a model of governance not driven by elections yet is competent, responsive, agile, and with effective checks and balances.

Today, crises of governance are plaguing nations around the world. From America’s paralyzing partisanship to Europe’s byzantine elitism, the developed world is steeped in stagnating malaise. In much of the developing world, from Thailand to Egypt, electoral regimes are either failing to deliver or have altogether lost legitimacy.

Although facing myriad challenges and growing pains, China stands apart in so many dimensions – economic development, poverty alleviation, and general social cohesion, to name just a few. On Mr. Xi’s watch, China will become the world’s largest economy. At the current trajectory, by the middle of this century, it will become a true great power in all aspects of its national power. This ancient civilization’s modern success could bring the world fresh perspectives and new possibilities. But that potential could not be realized without a coherent and mature system of political governance suitable to the country. The daring political reforms unleashed at The Third Plenum, if successful, will cement China’s political governance for many generations to come and pave the way for the ancient civilization to at last reclaim its place among the nations of the world. What happened last November in Beijing, then, may prove to be more consequential than most people in the world have recognized.

Eric X. Li is a venture capitalist and political scientist in Shanghai.