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以下為英文原文：

Guancha: These recollections mostly date from 2009, but you had waited until 2020 to publish them, why this long wait?

Oygard: Many of these issues are quite sensitive, and I didn't want to destroy the lives of anyone. So sometimes it just takes a bit of time before everyone can look at things with openness and you can be completely open about this. I think that was one reason. And then it just took time to prepare it and consider my thoughts and reflection on it.

What's special with this book is that there are many books that tells the story about the challenges that leads up to a crisis. There's also quite a lot of books that tell about what happens in the midst of the crisis. As far as I know, this is the only books that also covers very extensively what happens after the crisis. And that in a main way is the most amazing part of the story.

How this was handled in the year thereafter, allowing Iceland to return to a trajectory of economic growth to solve the debt problems, and actually ending up with less debt post-crisis than they had pre-crisis. And I think, as far as I know, that's the only country in the world that has achieved that. That process took years, right? The crisis hit in 2008. And I think the finalization of all these processes among the debt holders, was in 2018, 10 years later.

Guancha: You had taken perhaps one of the most difficult jobs during one of the difficult period in Iceland's recent history. Why were you, a Norwegian. selected for the job and why did you take it? During this process, as a foreigner, what difficulties did you encounter?

Oygard: I was selected, I believe, because I was part of the team that worked on the Norwegian financial crisis that we had in the early nineties. There were many lessons that were also very applicable in Iceland. So when Iceland was in crisis, when there was a need for a governor and when they concluded that for a while, the interim governor should be Norwegian, should be a partner. They called on me to take the job.

Why did I take it? I took it because I first saw it as an honor to be called to such a position to help a neighboring country. And of course, I do like challenges. And I think at that time, this was the largest challenge that was available anywhere out there that I actually could take. So that was a great privilege to take that position.

Guancha: Why did you leave after just half a year?

Oygard: It's actually a peculiarity, in the sense that the constitution of Iceland says that the a public position cannot be held by foreigner. They could make an exemption for the interim governor, but not for a permanent governor. And therefore, that was the reasons why I only could stay for a short period of time. If not, they would have to change the constitution for the country. They did change the law to enable me taking that position. But if I were to stay, they would need to also change the constitution. And that's a big step for any country.

Guancha: I guess that does show that Iceland was quite desperate, such that they had to find some legal tweaks to get someone from outside of Iceland for fix their mess.

Oygard: Yes. The interesting part of it is, the Icelandic Constitution was written in 1262, I believe Iceland has the oldest parliament of any country, they came together in 1262 at the place called Thingvellir, and they said, this is how we want to rule the country and it should be following these rules. In it they specified that all senior civil servant position in Iceland should be held by Icelanders, but on 27th of February 2009 they changed the law and the day after I got the job.

Guancha: Why was Iceland the only place to allow systemic banks to collapse? Do you think this approach by Iceland was ultimately better or worse compared with the alternative?

Oygard: You had the saying in certain situations that the banks are too big to fail. In Iceland, the banks were too big to save. They were simply so large in proportion to the economy, and they were largely depending on foreign currency for their funding, dollars and euros and so on, that there was simply not enough currency available in the country to save the banks even if they wanted to.

So that was the reason why it collapsed, the fact that you couldn't save the banks, that the three of the banks in the country, basically more than 90% of the banking system, went bankrupt in a week, that had immense costs because it accentuated the crisis. But in the end, it also proved to have some benefits in the sense that the cost of saving the bank were not taken on by the country and the citizens.

Guancha: Regarding the US approach where the big banks were bailed out, lots of people said this created a moral hazard going forward; in your judgment, holistically, do you think that not saving it compare to saving it, which one would be better in the long term?

Oygard: I think it's hard to tell. I think of course, in general, the societal cost of allowing a bank to go down is incredibly large. It basically threatens the robustness of the entire financial system. It comes at the cost of a potential moral hazard in the sense as you say the owners might be incentivized to take on too much risks pre-crisis to drive earnings, knowing that the government will basically pay them out if it gets into trouble. But I think by now, there’s a pretty clear precedent at least among the equity owners, the owners of the bank, that most of their values will be taken away from them if the bank defaults. So I think the risk of moral hazard from the owner’s perspective is less of a challenge in the modern banking system.

Guancha: What lessons do Iceland's recovery hold for other countries, especially today?

Oygard: It definitely has very important lessons to most countries. The main lesson is that if you have a problem, solve it right. Make firm decisions early. Don't try to drag on and solve the problems gradually. And that was what Iceland did, different to many other countries that weren't able to solve the challenge.

I think one of the stories I can tell on that is more from an economic, financial perspective; normally, if the GDP of a country drops by 10 percentage point, it's a very severe economic crisis, if you were to lose 10% of income that would be bad, but it would generally be manageable, you just need to address the challenge. The problem is that too many countries spend too much time on discussing who should carry the burden, instead of just solving the problems. It's a bit like going to a restaurant with many friends and then you get a big restaurant bill; in the end you have to share the bill, decide amongst your friends how to share. What you shouldn't do is start to fight and tear down the whole restaurant. Unfortunately, that's basically what many countries are doing. They just spend time fighting on who should take the bill instead of sharing the bill in a fair and equivalent manner.

Guancha: Well, I guess if there is an opportunity for you to pay nothing and get other people to pay the bill, then that's when you're gonna do.

Oygard: You're right. I think it's linked to culture, it’s linked to the legitimacy of the political institutions, it’s linked to the perception of fairness. If some try to run away from the bill, then it's more difficult to solve it. In many ways, I think that's the benefit of Iceland and also many of the other Nordic countries that had all been hit by financial crises, Norway and Sweden early in the 90s, Denmark even earlier, and also Finland. So all of them have been through these crises, but all have been able to get through the crisis very quickly compare to countries like Greece and Spain and Italy and Argentina that basically has spent decades on striving to split the Bill as opposed to addressing it head on.

Guancha: Here in China, local governments and some companies have run into debt issues as you may have heard. Do you have any advice on how they can be resolved given the cultural and other context in China?

Oygard: I think it's hard for a foreigner to give advice to any country, also for China. But of course, what often happens is that there are companies that take on too much debt and that means the ownership value of the equity is too low compared to the debt. My general advice is to try whatever is possible to find a solution and even to convert part of the debt to equity and give the debt holders a stake in the enterprises. If you do that, most often you can solve the crisis without triggering a broader economic challenge to the total economy. So moving early, try to restructure the entities and deal with the problems as opposed to choosing a way to deal with it that leads to problems for the entire country.

Guancha: So moving back to 2008, regarding the cause of the financial crisis, Ben Bernanke believe that Congress and Wall Street had deliberately condoned real estate bubbles for their own purposes. Do you think that a similar crisis might happen again?

Oygard: Yes, for sure. Normally, the starting point for a financial crisis is that it's preceded by a situation with too much debt. Some entity, it could be a bank, it could be a country, it could be the household, it could be the government, takes up too much debt. By taking on debt, of course, you can grow the enterprises, you can grow the company, you can grow consumption quicker, and that of course looks attractive for many.

And that's the challenge. When you're in a bubble economy, where a lot of debt is taken on, you get what's perceived to be strong growth, people make more money, asset values increase; in any economic system, in particular in market based economy, there's always a temptation to take on too much debt. And if you take on too much debt, then you get crisis.

Right now, there's too much debt in the world and it's allocated in a way that leads to a risk of financial troubles.

Guancha: How do you think we can either change culture or structure society in some way to get more long term thinking instead of just a short term focus on GDP growth?

Oygard: I think one way is to be very diligent, observe what's happening very closely and that the institutions that are tasked to oversee these companies like IMF, but also the rating agencies, call out when they see this kind of things happening. For the policymakers, of course, to be prudent, for the banks themselves to be more risk averse and all of us not to fall for the temptation to earn a quick buck by taking on risk for ourselves and for the society.

Guancha: What do you think of the bank collapses this year? Do you think that central banks have taken the right approach in response?

Oygard: The starting point is that we have been through almost 20 years with ever decreasing rates of inflation, which then leads to ever decreasing interest rate levels. Many entities had basically adapted themselves to this situation. Then, with the rising inflation that is followed by high interest rate, many structures are challenged.

What was most surprising about these collapses was that they occurred at such an early point in the cycle. And of course, Silicon Valley Bank in itself is spectacular, that you actually can, can go bankrupt by government bonds, no one even thought that would be possible.

I think the central bank did what was appropriate. They moved in and they restructured the bank. They move the deposits to other institutions. They took on the debt. So I think it was done in a good way.

What's also been surprising is that it's been very quiet since then, nothing has happened for the last nine months, even though the process of increasing interest rate has continued. This means that most probably more will happen in the months to come. So I think we all should be prepared for that. I'm sure the financial supervisory agencies are prepared for that. I hope the central banks are prepared for that because we haven't seen the end of the troubles in this cycle.

Guancha: There's been a paradigm shift over the past two years from the previous paradigm of ever decreasing interest rate and little to no inflation. Now people even in Europe are seeing inflation and suddenly interest rate can go back up in a big way. Over the next few years, how do you think the world economy and businesses will adjust to this new reality?

Oygard: I think in that most of us in the western world, we're going to go through some painful years. We all get spoiled by having interest rates that went down year by year, now is increasing. And it's deliberate because that's the measure that used to fight the inflation. I think the inflationary pressure is still there, it’s actually quite strong. There’s all kinds of different reasons for that. But until the inflation pressure diminishes, the interest rate hike will continue.

What can companies do? To the extent that they don't have buffers, they need to build buffers, we all needs to be a bit cautious in the way we operate. And with that, hopefully, we will get through in a good way. Will there be a bumps along the way? Yes, definitely. And I think that's also something we need to be prepared for, maybe have more tolerance for banks to collapse occasionally, and it doesn't need to be the end of the world if the policymakers are decisive in the way they intervene.

Guancha: Do you think other countries could copy Iceland's great success or is it more specific to Iceland or a Nordic country?

Oygard: I think there are elements of it that are fairly useful. Imagine that you have a hundred patients, and they are all very sick, then there's one patient that gets a cure that's different from all others. That one patient initially was hit the hardest, but is also the one that recovers the most quickly. And that was Iceland. So of course, in certain situations, if that would be in medicine, we would look at that case and see what can we learn from it. Here in finance, we all need to look at that case and see what can be learned from it.

Guancha: Is this something that's still being explored or is there a consensus?

Oygard: I think there’s part of it where there's a consensus. I think a number of the tools and the approaches that was used to solve the Icelandic crisis, they have been taken on and even included in the toolbox of the IMF for their institution that works on this, to solve crises in other countries. Iceland has changed kind of the world in the sense that many of the mechanisms that they and we develop together in those years have actually proven to be very relevant and therefore now are applied more broadly.

One example is capital controls. Up until what happened in Iceland, the general rule, even forbidden in the European Union system, was you can’t limit capital movements. In Iceland, when everything collapsed, capital control was introduced. So it will still allow to, to move exports and imports back and forth and to pay for it, but you were not allowed to take Icelandic currency out of the country for pure financial reasons. And that was done because there was a fear that there will be a constant outflow of capital from Iceland so that the Icelandic Kroner would get weaker and weaker, leading to ever higher level of inflation. So with support of the IMF that actually earlier said this is forbidden, a mechanism to stop capital control was introduced and that tool has now been apply later, for example in Argentina in 2019, 2020.

Guancha: I guess that kind of shows that the Washington consensus has its limits.

Oygard: Yeah, sometimes you have to reconsider the tools. And in this situation, there were specific features that apply, because every crisis has some similarity and some differences. And here it just triggered a need for such a mechanism. And that mechanism actually proved to be quite relevant also for other situations.

Guancha: After publication, came Covid and the issues of the past few years. Would you update anything from your book given your vantage point now?

Oygard: No, not really. Covid was very serious, but I think in the history of the world, it will shortly be seen like a dip on a long term trajectory. I think what I wrote pre-Covid, also with regard to my comments of the future, are still very relevant. I also wrote in the book that we would get into this inflationary problem. So I'm not saying I have this fantastic foresight, but at least there were elements that you clearly could see would happen.

So I think it's all relevant. It's important, especially for the young people to learn from history, because financial crisis don't occur every year, instead they incur every 10,15 years, if you wait until your experience them yourself, you might be a very old man before you experience them, and you will lose a lot of money along the way. If you take the time to read about it and understand it based on this history from Iceland, then you will be prepared. If you're an investor, if you're a interested in economic policy, if you're a policymaker, whoever you are, it’s just cheaper and better to read about it as compared to having to live through it yourself.

Guancha: Another one of Iceland success was that initially it’s economic model was more reliant on natural resource extraction and was plagued by inflation, currency devaluation and the like. But now it's a more diversified economy. Do you think that's something developing countries in the Global south can learn from?

Oygard: I would say definitely, yes. Because of the level of education in the country, the entrepreneurism and even the use of social media and digital platforms, Iceland has, despite being a very small country, been able to prosper. In many areas, you could say the scale benefits of big countries have been taken away because, for example, of the digitalization technology and social media platform.

Therefore, Iceland has been able to grow in the service industry, has been able to grow in tourism, and also grow its manufacturing base. It used to have the traditional fisheries based on wild catch, now it has fish farming as a supplement.

It was to some extent triggered by the crisis, that people had to do something different. This was triggered by this immense weakening of the currency that made Iceland for a while very competitive. But it's also triggered by the new technologies, the digitalization and the new social media landscape. So I think it should be an inspiration for all countries that you can actually use these elements to grow and make a big jump forward.

Guancha: There may only be so much room within a specific industry, if other countries try to join, competition will make growth based on these industries more difficult.

Oygard: That's the way it is. You always have an opportunity and you move to seize it, and then if you're followed by others, then you just need to get better and work harder and be more productive. That's just the challenge and the beauty of the market economy.

Guancha: The current NATO secretary general Stoltenberg is also a member of the Norwegian Labor Party as you and you both had worked in the Ministry of finance and Norwegian Parliament before. Do you have any recollection, good or bad, from your encounters with him?

Oygard: I worked closely with them for 5, 6 years. When I was deputy Minister of Finance, he also worked in the government. And he actually even asked me, I'd tell the story in my book, he asked me to become minister of finance of Norway. I was called into his office and he made this request. I decided to turn it down because I had other plans.

I know him well. I know him to be a very dedicated professional, he’s an economist in training, he is well able to reflect on the questions that matters. His father was a diplomat. So I think he also has brought with him the ability to pursue what he thinks is right, but also in a way that brings people together. So I think he’s a strong character and it was also a pleasure working with him. And of course, he's doing important work as Secretary General of NATO.

Guancha: He was supposed to retire this year, returning to financing. But now he has to keep on being the NATO secretary general.

Oygard: As an economist, one of the most prestigious positons is to be the Central Banker governor. I think his secret dream has been to become the central bank governor of Norway, and actually he visited me in Iceland when I was there. He wanted to become central bank governor and had applied, but then he was asked by by NATO, by the president of the USA himself to stay on as NATO Secretary General, then he need to let go of his childhood dream of being a central bank governor to take on the position at NATO. But as I said, when I was appointed central governor of Iceland, my first visitor in the central bank was actually Jen Stoltenberg, who by coincidence was at Iceland. So we discussed the challenge that I had and he gave some good advice along the way, which was valuable given his knowledge and at that time position as the Prime Minister of Norway.

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