-
洪農:中國將如何應對菲律賓的“第二次國際仲裁公關”?
Club點評:6月25日,中美研究中心ICAS執行主任、北京對話特約專家洪農,在南華早報發表題為《Legal moves turn South China Sea into a public image battleground》(法律舉動將南海變成了公關戰場)的評論文章。洪農指出,菲律賓再次利用國際仲裁和申訴作為公關工具,旨在提升自身形象并挑戰中國的一貫主張。但是,如果某些國家僅在對自己有利時才援引國際法,它們可能會被指責虛偽。國際法的復雜性和靈活詮釋性,使得各國都能夠操縱法律論點以符合自身敘述。中國在解決南海爭端問題時,會堅持原有的雙邊磋商,還是引入新的辦法?
同日,據報道,菲律賓外交部長馬納羅表示,菲律賓希望與中國就南海問題進行對話,以解決分歧。
最近,中國和菲律賓在南沙群島仁愛礁的沖突,加劇了南海的緊張局勢。自1999年以來,菲律賓通過故意擱淺在那里的二戰時服役的坦克登陸艦“馬德雷山號”(BRP Sierra Madre)及駐扎其上的一小支海軍陸戰隊員,維持著在該海域的存在感,以及對該地區的領土主張。
中國用“九段線”來申明對該島礁的主權,并曾采取行動阻止菲律賓將仁愛礁變成軍事基地,還試圖阻止菲律賓的補給船抵達“馬德雷山號”。
菲律賓則對中方的行動提出了外交抗議,并尋求增強自身的軍事和后勤能力。菲律賓政府重申了在仁愛礁附近繼續活動的決心,還呼吁國際社會給予支持。中國則指責菲律賓故意制造沖突事件以博取更多國際關注和同情。
菲律賓采取的這些行動,使南海局勢更加復雜。盡管菲律賓目前沒有正式宣布要對中國發起新一輪仲裁聽證,但有報道稱,這方面的討論已經開始了。
為了反對其認為的中國的非法行為,菲律賓可能會尋求仲裁。更有甚者,菲律賓或將強調他們擔心中國的有關活動可能對海底環境造成的破壞。
6月14日,菲律賓請求大陸架界限委員會(CLCS)—一個根據《聯合國海洋法公約》設立的國際機構—承認其大陸架外部界限在西巴拉望地區延伸超過200海里。盡管CLCS沒有執法權,但它可以研究各國延伸大陸架主張的技術細節并提供建議。
這一尋求仲裁和向CLCS提交申請并舉的做法,反映了菲律賓利用國際法律機制來維護自身主張、并挑戰中國在南海的一貫海域主張的戰略。
這些法律舉動的時機和有效性表明,各國將國際法視為公關工具,讓其同時服務于戰略和外交目的。這一點在菲律賓與中國之間的南海爭端中尤為突出。
這一方法提供了幾個潛在優勢。首先,許多國家將援引國際法標榜為“基于規則的國際秩序”的擁護者,從而獲得國際社會的支持和同情。對于菲律賓來說,使用《聯合國海洋法公約》來框定其在南海的主張可以增強自己的道德和法律站位。
菲律賓將自己描繪成在世界舞臺上遵紀守法、負責任的形象,從而加強自己在談判中的立場。同時,它對于中國“霸凌”行為和所謂環境破壞活動的“南海行為敘事”,可以在其國內外聽眾中引起強烈共鳴。這提升了菲律賓領導人的形象,讓他們看上去是敢于挑戰一個強國的“勇者”。
當前爭端的核心法律問題圍繞條約法(《聯合國海洋法公約》)以及國際習慣法的歷史權利之間的關系;菲律賓強調前者,而中國立場基于后者。然而,有時國際社會對中國的立場充耳不聞。
其次,有一種觀點認為,國際法為較小或力量較弱的國家提供了一個挑戰更強大對手的平臺。通過強調其堅持原則和國際準則,菲律賓旨在抵消中國的經濟和軍事力量優勢。2016年有利于菲利賓的仲裁庭裁決似乎傳遞了這樣一個信息:法律訴訟可以把小國的聲音放大。
這種觀點還認為,中國退出仲裁程序的決定,影響了其合法海洋主張的正當性。因此,中國被描繪成了一個試圖對小國施加軍事和經濟壓力的大國。
此外,戰略性地利用國際法可以影響國際輿論并左右其他國家的外交政策。通過強調中國不遵守國際裁決,菲律賓正在影響全球輿論,并可能在鼓勵其他國家支持其立場,從而在外交上孤立中國。
然而,菲律賓真的在追求法律結果嗎?菲律賓向CLCS提交的程序無可爭議。任何簽訂了《聯合國海洋法公約》的沿海國家都有權向CLCS提交申請。同樣,中國在6月18日向聯合國秘書長提交了一份照會,提出,任何關于南海爭議水域的提交都不應被考慮。
照會內容 圖源:互聯網
其實,將國際法作為公關工具也有其局限性。如果某些國家僅在對自己有利時才援引國際法,它們可能會被指責虛偽。國際法的復雜性和靈活詮釋性,使得各國能夠操縱法律論點以符合自身敘述。
此外,國際法通常缺乏強有力的執行機制,這意味著在法庭或仲裁庭上的勝利,可能不會轉化為現實中的改變。2016年的仲裁結果未能對解決菲律賓和中國之間的主要矛盾做出積極貢獻,反而進一步加劇了兩國間的緊張局勢。那么,中國在解決南海爭端問題時,會堅持原有的雙邊磋商,還是引入新的辦法?
(翻譯:王奕涵 核譯:韓樺)
英文原文:
Recent clashes between China and the Philippines over the Second Thomas Shoal have heightened tensions in the South China Sea. The Philippines has maintained a presence there since 1999 by stationing a small contingent of marines on the BRP Sierra Madre, a deliberately grounded World War II-era ship symbolising its claims over the area.
China also claims the shoal based on its nine-dash line. It has taken actions to prevent the Philippines from turning the shoal into a military base and attempted to prevent resupply boats from the Philippines from reaching the Sierra Madre.
In response to Chinese actions, the Philippines has lodged diplomatic protests and sought to bolster its military and logistical capabilities. The Philippine government has reiterated its commitment to maintaining its presence at Second Thomas Shoal and has called for international support. Meanwhile, China has accused the Philippines of staging incidents to gain more international attention and sympathy.
The Philippines has taken further actions that add to the complexity of the South China Sea status quo. While there haven’t been any official announcements regarding initiating new arbitration hearings against China, reports suggest there have been discussions to that end.
The Philippines might seek arbitration to challenge specific Chinese actions it sees as illegal. Additionally, the Philippines might aim to highlight concerns about potential environmental damage from Chinese activities on the seabed.
On June 14, the Philippines requested that the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) – an international body established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) – recognise that the outer limits of its continental shelf extended beyond 200 nautical miles in the West Palawan region. Although the CLCS lacks enforcement power, it provides recommendations by reviewing the technical details of a country’s extended continental shelf claims.
This dual approach of seeking arbitration and submitting claims to the CLCS reflects the Philippines’ strategy of using international legal mechanisms to uphold its claims and challenge China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea.
However, the timing and effectiveness of these legal actions suggest countries see international law as a tool for public image campaigns, serving both strategic and diplomatic purposes. This is particularly evident in the South China Sea dispute between the Philippines and China.
This approach offers several potential advantages. First, invoking international law lets countries position themselves as adherents to a rules-based international order, garnering support and sympathy from the global community. For the Philippines, framing its claims in the South China Sea through Unclos enhances its moral and legal standing.
The Philippines portrays itself as a law-abiding and responsible actor on the world stage, strengthening its negotiating position. The narratives of China’s bullying behaviour and environmentally damaging activities resonate strongly with domestic and international audiences. This boosts the image of Filipino leaders as courageous individuals willing to confront a powerful nation.
The central legal issue revolves around the relationship between Unclos as treaty law, which the Philippines emphasises, and historic rights as customary international law, upon which China bases its claims. However, China’s side of the story can sometimes go unheard within the international community.
Second, there is the notion that international law provides smaller or less powerful countries with a platform to challenge larger, more powerful adversaries. By emphasising its commitment to principles and international norms, the Philippines aims to offset China’s economic and military strength. The 2016 arbitration panel ruling in the Philippines’ favour seemed to send a message how legal recourse can amplify the voice of smaller nations.
Meanwhile, China finds itself in a weakened position before the international community. Its decision to walk away from the arbitration proceedings undermined the legitimacy of its legal maritime claims. Consequently, China is portrayed as a major state seeking to exert its military and economic power over smaller states.
Furthermore, the strategic use of international law can shape international opinion and influence foreign policy decisions of other states. By highlighting China’s non-compliance with international rulings, the Philippines is swaying global opinion and potentially encouraging other nations to support its stance, isolating China diplomatically.
However, is the Philippines truly pursuing a legal outcome? The procedures of the Philippines’ submission to the CLCS are beyond question. Any coastal state that has ratified Unclos has the right to submit applications to the CLCS. Similarly, China sent a note verbale on June 18 to the United Nations secretary general, arguing that any submissions regarding the disputed waters in the South China Sea should not be considered.
Meanwhile, using international law as a tool for public image campaigns has its limitations. Countries could be accused of hypocrisy if they invoke international law only when it is convenient. The complexity and interpretative nature of international law allow countries to manipulate legal arguments to fit their narratives.
Additionally, international law often lacks robust enforcement mechanisms, meaning victories in courts or tribunals might not translate into real change on the ground. The outcome of the 2016 arbitration did not make a meaningful contribution to resolving the main issues between the Philippines and China but instead further escalated tensions.
Another implication is whether China will turn to international litigation or arbitration to pursue its maritime claims. Will China’s conventional approach of bilateral negotiations and consultations remain its preferred method for settling interstate disputes?
Alternatively, will it come to accept that third-party dispute resolution has a pivotal role to play in resolving issues with neighbouring countries? The Philippines’ legal manoeuvring could prompt China to re-evaluate its usual approach to resolving maritime disputes in the South China Sea.
- 原標題:中國將如何應對菲律賓的“第二次國際仲裁公關”? 本文僅代表作者個人觀點。
- 責任編輯: 小婷 
-
“我們完蛋了”民主黨人很慌,私下討論換人…
2024-06-28 17:51 美國大選 -
中老泰馬跨境鐵路班列雙向首發
2024-06-28 17:29 -
拜登表現糟糕,民主黨要換人嗎?
2024-06-28 17:23 -
習近平舉行儀式歡迎秘魯總統博魯阿爾特訪華
2024-06-28 16:43 中國外交 -
東電啟動第七批核污染水排海,外交部表態
2024-06-28 15:51 福島核泄漏 -
馬朝旭同美國常務副國務卿坎貝爾通話
2024-06-28 15:42 中美關系 -
外交部:胡友平女士體現了中國人民的善良和勇敢
2024-06-28 15:36 中日關系 -
菲外交官員接連放風:想和中國談,就選在7月初
2024-06-28 15:26 南海局勢 -
辯論后領先57個百分點?特朗普到底“贏”多少
2024-06-28 14:40 -
“美方抹黑中國疫苗,致菲數以萬計民眾身亡,為何一直對此緘默無語”
2024-06-28 14:18 中國外交 -
美最高法院:官員拿企業“酬金”,不算受賄了…
2024-06-28 13:58 美國一夢 -
美議員怒噴美國商會:他們不愿多付幾美分,將產業拱手送給中國
2024-06-28 13:31 中美關系 -
“別像個孩子一樣,好嗎?”
2024-06-28 13:09 美國大選 -
他提出“非同尋常的建議”:中歐一起征稅15%
2024-06-28 11:53 德意志 -
被拜登噴“妻子懷孕期間找艷星”,特朗普怒了
2024-06-28 11:53 美國大選 -
日本駐華大使館降半旗:向胡友平女士的大義之舉致敬
2024-06-28 10:39 中日關系 -
“拜登領導下的美國就像第三世界國家”
2024-06-28 10:37 美國大選 -
他大放厥詞:還以為中國會變得更像美國,但大錯特錯
2024-06-28 09:37 中美關系 -
“雖有矛盾,但歡迎中國對菲投資”
2024-06-28 09:30 -
歐盟多數領導人同意馮德萊恩連任,意大利棄權匈牙利反對
2024-06-28 09:07
相關推薦 -
刺激消費,全民“發錢”這招可行嗎? 評論 240美國申訴后奪銅,羅馬尼亞徹底怒了 評論 258“去過中國30次,反對中美敵對”,共和黨猛攻他親華 評論 191“阿克薩洪水策劃人”辛瓦爾被選為哈馬斯領導人 評論 338“中國為我們所做的一切,都是美國做不到的” 評論 157最新聞 Hot
-
韓國教練哭了:20年了,每次都輸給中國隊
-
美議員聲稱擔心中企當“間諜”,密歇根州州長已讀不回
-
澳大利亞奧運選手涉嫌在巴黎購買可卡因被捕
-
馬杜羅:WhatsApp見鬼去吧,建議改用微信…
-
日本長崎拒絕邀請以色列,G7另外六國不干了
-
美國申訴后奪銅,羅馬尼亞徹底怒了
-
他欲召集拉美17國開會討論委局勢,還請求美國支持
-
共和黨人一看,覺得自己又行了
-
“他建議我主修中文,這真的改變了我的生活”
-
他遭美司法部逮捕,被控受伊朗指使欲雇兇刺殺特朗普
-
“去過中國30次,反對中美敵對”,共和黨猛攻他親華
-
“跟隨歐洲盟友步伐,他計劃訪華”
-
烏軍突入俄境內7公里,俄稱擊退進攻
-
“中巴合作不應滿足于現狀,加入‘一帶一路’是根本措施”
-
員工曝波音工廠亂象,“換問題艙門像換內褲一樣頻繁”
-
“阿克薩洪水策劃人”辛瓦爾被選為哈馬斯領導人
-