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周波:是美國叫囂要在臺灣海峽使用核武器,而不是中國大陸
Zhou Bo:Thank you,Ambassador Peter Jenkins. This is indeed a great honor for me to talk to distinguished Pugwash members. I'm especially grateful that my master of St Edmund’s College Sir Brian Heap is also present,particularly because he actually is suffering from COVID.
Today,I'm going to talk on a few aspects that are nuclear and China-related. The first question is,are we already in another nuclear age? Let me quote what late Premier Zhou Enlai said when he was asked by a French journalist,“what do you think of the French revolution?” His answer was reportedly“ it is too early to tell”. Then,have we entered into a new cold war? Again,probably it is also too early to tell. But if we would have nuclear weapon states like United States to kick off nuclear tests,as suggested by a number of Americans,including former American national security adviser Robert O’brien,who encouraged Trump to conduct a nuclear test should he become reelected,I am very much sure it will be followed by others. Then we definitely can say the big bangs of nuclear test herald the dawn of another nuclear age.
Let me first talk about the possibility of a nuclear war in Europe and China’s position. According to CIA’s estimate,the chance of a nuclear war in Ukraine is at 50 %. We don't know exactly what might happen, but according to CSIS,there are over 200 cases of Russian leadership referring to use of nuclear weapon in the context of the war in Ukraine. The question is,how serious are Russians? What we are seeing is that a few days ago,President Putin has ordered change of nuclear doctrine. Basically,that means lowering the threshold. The nuclear weapons might be used in response to an attack on Russia and Belarus using conventional weapons,if the attack poses a crucial threat to sovereignty. This kind of description about crucial threat to sovereignty actually is ambiguous,because then comes the question- What is crucial threat?
I personally believe there are a few situations in which Russia might be more likely to use nuclear weapons. One is,if they might lose Crimea,which is not quite possible in the current circumstance.
And then if they lose the four Southeastern regions that are already declared to be Russian territory under Russia’s constitution. Of course,there is a huge debate as to whether they could have full control of the four regions or not.
I believe the right answer is,nobody knows how the endgame looks like. Once I had a conversation with a Ukrainian ambassador who said something that really impressed me. I asked how long will the war last? She said “our grandchildren will continue to fight”. I don't know whether that is true or not,but that is what she said. So this is the second possibility,but the last one probably looks most real. That is when a red line no longer looks like a red line. I believe that is the time when the situation is most dangerous. I'm referring to Ukraine fighting deeper and deeper into the Russian territory using the weapons provided by the West. If that is the red line in the beginning,it no longer looks like a red line.
Then let's look at what has happened about the NATO expansion. I have talked to many people in the West. They don't believe that NATO’s expansion is the very reason that Russia decided to have a conflict with Ukraine,but I believe it is. In fact,warnings from Russia do not start from President Putin. It came from the Soviet time. It came from Mikhail Gorbachev down to Boris Yeltsin to President Putin. And what makes Putin different? He's the man who said enough is enough. So how the endgame in Ukraine would look like? It's too early to tell,but I assume the biggest possibility is a kind of armistice,very much like that in the Korean peninsula. But this armistice would be more volatile because one party is one of the P-5 countries with the largest nuclear stockpile in the world.
I assume I know what Russia is going to do -- play with kind of a nuclear ambiguity,or make very serious nuclear threats in decades to come. Why is that? The reason is very simple. Because Russia's conventional force has declined tremendously compared to the cold war era. Unlike in 1982 when they actually announced no first-use on nuclear weapons,in 1993,they dropped this pledge because after the dissolution of Soviet Union,Russia is no longer as strong as before in conventional forces.
Then,what about China? First of all,I need to say something about China's friendship with Russia,which,described as “unlimited partnership”, alarms the whole West.
But for me,this kind of unlimited partnership is just a natural description of China’s good wish to develop friendship with its largest neighbor. Just think of this: If I say I want to develop my friendship with you,but then I say,hang on for a moment,this friendship has to be limited. What do you think? Let me give you another example. When we talk to Pakistanis,Pakistanis would often say China-Pakistan friendship is higher than the Himalayan mountain,deeper than the Arabian sea,and sweeter than honey. What would you do? You would smile,and probably nod your head,because you know that they mean no harm.
The second thing is,China is not a “decisive enabler of Russia” as NATO described. I know the West is not happy with China exporting a lot of items that might be dual use in nature. But when something is dual use in nature,first,we have to assume it is a civilian item rather than a military product. Just like oil and gas. Nobody considers oil and gas military products. But if it is put into the tank of a military truck,it could immediately become a military product. Therefore,when something is dual-use in nature,we have to assume it is for civilian use first.
China has indeed exported more things to Russia,partly because Russia being sanctioned needs more import from elsewhere,and partly because China of course wants to export more because Chinese economic growth has slowed down. But none of these exports is violating any international treaties. On Russia using nuclear weapons,I think in China,all people from ordinary Chinese people to Chinese leadership,the attitude is quite clear. I myself has written an opinion that was published in Financial Times ending with a sentence: don't use nuclear weapons,Mr. President. I know the good relationship between China and Russia,but I also know it is a decades-old firm Chinese policy of not using nuclear weapons first,and not use nuclear weapons against nuclear weapon free countries and zones.
In November 2022,President Xi told visiting German chancellor Olaf Scholz no use of nuclear weapons in Europe. Olaf Scholz’s visit to China was criticized by some people. He went back and said even for this consensus,his visit to China was worthwhile.
Then I need to say something about P-5 joint statement in 2022 before Russia's war in Ukraine. This is an old slogan coming from the cold war -- nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. But what is most interesting is that when President Xi Jinping visited Russia in March,2023 amid the war, again we had a joint statement between China and Russia in which this slogan was repeated. I think China has been trying its best in telling Russia not to use nuclear weapons. Otherwise,how could we have this joint statement? That means China is really trying hard to make its due contribution towards peace and stability in Europe. We don't know whether Russia will use nukes or not. But I think the attitude of China,India,and Brazil matters for Russia. And I hope it matters.
So I believe right now,President Putin probably is the most rational person in the Russian leadership,because he denied the possibility of using nuclear weapons when he was asked by Karaganov whether Russia should use it or not,he said no.
Now let me talk about China’s nuclear modernization. Reportedly,China has 500 nuclear warheads. And it has an ambition to increase this nuclear arsenal to 1,500 by 2035 according to the Pentagon. No one in China will confirm this number because this is considered a secret in China. But even if this is true, China’s nuclear arsenal is apparently still much smaller than that of the United States and Russia. Both of them have more than 5,000 nuclear warheads. For China to increase its nuclear arsenal,technically and economically,it is simple. China has technical know-how and China is the strongest industrial nation on earth. China’s economy is at least 10 times larger than Russia.
So what is impeding China from having more nuclear warheads? I believe that is because China believes it should not enter into a nuclear arms race. China’s defense budget tells more than anything about this. Why? Because I believe in international relations,there are two things that won't lie. Geography would not lie,because your operations would be very much constrained by geography,such as in Korean peninsula. People have been talking about how DPRK might launch a nuclear attack,but think of Korean peninsula,which is just 1200 kilometers in length. Given the nuclear radioactive dust that will surely linger on the peninsular,the question is in what kind of situation would the North Korean leader decide to launch a nuclear attack that is surely suicidal? Then,defense budget would not lie,because defense budget,whether you increase it or not,will tell your real assessment about the environment,about your self-confidence and about your adversaries or enemies.
China’s defense budget has been under 2 % for four decades. Basically,most of the time,it's around or even lower than 1.5 % of its GDP. This tells a lot about China. It tells China is confident about itself. It tells China is confident about the region. And it even tells China is confident about the China-U.S. relationship. China's confidence certainly matters,because if China is not confident,if it drastically increases defense budget like India and Japan,then the whole Asia-Pacific would be chaotic.
Then,let me try to explain what does “keeping the nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security” mean. This is quoted in several Chinese defense white paper. What is the minimum level? My personal understanding is,no nuclear weapon states dare to launch a preemptive nuclear strike on China in spite of China’s no-first use of nuclear weapons. This in turn requires China to have adequate strength of deterrence.
Everybody knows that recently,China launched ICBM into the Southern Pacific. What does this mean? The Chinese press release didn't tell much,but I believe it is a boost of Chinese people's confidence in its own military. It is also a demonstration of China’s military capability. It also demonstrates that China would have to modernize its armed forces. I think modernization means new capabilities and reasonably increased quantity. If you just keep the same number,then you are just doing a maintenance job. China’s launch has been notified to the United States. The United States has expressed appreciation for this. This invited a question: would the United States also notify China about its nuclear activities or about its ICBM launches one day? Especially because China and the United States have actually signed agreement on mutual notification of major military activities. Then what are major military activities? Of course,China's launch of ICBM is one of them. What about the United States? Would you notify China what you are going to do in the South China sea? Or when your ships are going to sail through Taiwan Strait?
Perhaps it will be surprising for you to know that I am going to talk about the possibility of a nuclear war in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese government still talks about peaceful unification. Even the American secretary of defense Lloyd Austin said at Shangri-La Dialogue a war is not imminent or inevitable. I'm happy he talked about this,because this is a direct denial of quite a few allegations from some American generals and admirals that China is about to attack Taiwan in 2025 or 2027,so on and so forth,because Austin should have talked with authority based on briefings,information and intelligence.
We certainly would not use nuclear weapons against our own people in Taiwan. This can hardly be imagined for any Chinese. But the question is,there are some Americans like former deputy assistant secretary Elbridge Colby,or some think tanks like Atlantic Council talking about United States using nuclear weapons first in Taiwan Strait,because they believe the US military is becoming inferior to the PLA in terms of conventional warfare. My answer is that we have to let the United States give up this crazy idea. And for that to happen,I think we have to increase some nuclear weapons so we can prevail in a conventional war against the United States in which the United States dare not use nuclear weapons against China first.
There are two myths on China’s nuclear policy. One is that China doesn't want talks on nuclear disarmament. You should have heard a lot about this. But my argument is that it really depends on what you want to talk to China. How about talking about Chinese proposal -- no first-use of nuclear weapons? China is more than willing to talk about this. But if you want to talk to China to find out the speed and scale of China’s nuclear modernization or development,probably you would become disappointed. Because for China and the US to talk about nuclear disarmament,there has to be a parity--either China has to drastically increases its nuclear stockpile,or the United States has to drastically decrease its nuclear stockpile to reach an equilibrium. None of them looks possible. The second myth is something most recent and most ridiculous,the so-called “nuclear employment guidance” of the United States. It is reported that the U.S. has to prepare for coordinated nuclear confrontation with China,Russia and North Korea simultaneously.
My question is,when have China,Russia and North Korea coordinated their nuclear weapons? I can hardly remember when China had a joint exercise with the North Korean military. How come we have coordinated our nuclear weapons? This is totally insane. People making a strategy based upon such insane analysis is crazy.
Then let me talk about what I believe is China-U.S. strategic stability. Strategic stability during the cold war refers to the equilibrium in nuclear weapons,but I believe between China and the U.S.,we can actually have a kind of strategic stability,not only on the number of warheads,but also including some new areas,that is cyber,AI and outer space.
I believe China and the US can afford to talk to each other in these three areas just because the gaps between the two sides are not so big in these areas. As I have proposed in my article in “Foreign Affairs”,in cyber,we should exchange a list of sensitive targets between China and U.S. that should not be attacked in any circumstances; In AI,we should make sure absolute human control over the command & control,especially the nuclear command & control system; and in outer space,we should discuss no-placement of weapons in outer space,as China and Russia have proposed. At the same time,we can also discuss what the West has proposed: to talk about rules and responsible behaviors.
Now let me come to the final part of what I am going to say-- Why I consider no-first use of nuclear weapons China proposed is affordable for all nuclear weapons states. This is what I have written recently in “Foreign Policy” magazine. Because I believe,first of all,there are two preconditions for us to talk about nuclear disarmament. First,it is impossible to ban nuclear weapons anytime soon. I know there is a treaty about prohibition of nuclear weapons in 2017 by non-nuclear weapons states. But none of the nuclear weapon states would wish to ban nuclear weapons now.
So it is impossible. Again,what is equally impossible is that the nuclear weapon states would wish to reduce their nuclear stockpiles amid ever intensifying competition. As I’ve just said, probably China would also have to reasonably increase its nuclear stockpile. But I believe with these two as preconditions,no first-use looks like the most realistic approach in reducing nuclear threats. Why is that? Simply put,it would not reduce your capabilities for retaliation,even if you promise no-first use. At the same time,you would enjoy moral high ground. Another reason is,I believe,after some studies,that American,British,and French nuclear policies actually are not so far away from China’s no first use. Let me come to each one of these countries.
For example,American’s recent nuclear policy has changed a bit,but until 2022,for example,in its nuclear posture review,it said that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in the extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States and its allies and partners. What confused me is the key word,“vital interests”. I just cannot imagine what kind of vital interests or interests of allies would require United States to use nuclear weapons first. Didn't the United States already use nuclear weapons first? What kind of interests are so important for United States that,having the strongest conventional forces and also one of the largest numbers of nuclear warheads,the US still would have to use nuclear weapons first? I know American allies are concerned. They want the United States to provide nuclear umbrella. But let me come back to the example,which I mentioned before.
Let's talk about the DPRK. DPRK would make threats from time to time.
But how likely would it be for them to really launch a nuclear attack? Because any use of nuclear weapons would be suicidal given the radioactive dust that would be lingering over Korean peninsula. So the right question is,in what kind of circumstances would DPRK decide to commit suicide? The answer is unless they believe they can no longer live,so they want to die with you. If we believe in the rationality of the DPRK leadership,then we do not need to worry about their first use of nuclear weapons.
The nuclear policy of UK is very much similar to that of the United States,because UK also talks about using nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defense. And when we come to France,F(xiàn)rance has pledged to hold to a principle of strict sufficiency. This is why I have concluded that the nuclear policies of these countries actually are not that far away from China’s.
The biggest challenge is how to get Russia in. Actually,I would say Russia’s strategy to “escalate to deescalate” has worked in the war in Ukraine,because so far,the United States has still put some limits on what Ukraine can do with weapons that it has supplied. So how can Russia give it up to pledge no-first use? Because there is a dilemma of this strategy,because this strategy to “escalate to deescalate” depends on threats and fear of threats by other people. The point is,if people are threatened,they might become afraid. But if you really use nukes, you cannot control the scale of the retaliation by your adversaries,a tit-for-tat risks of becoming a full blown nuclear war that nobody wants. For Russia,it might just invite the involvement of NATO,the very thing that Moscow fears most if Russia really uses nuclear weapons.
This is why I suggest a kind of a dual track approach,my personal suggestion. In Europe,I suggest two steps for NATO. The first step is that NATO makes a unilateral no-first use pledge against Russia as a gesture of goodwill. Does NATO want to use nuclear weapons first against Russia? Never. So you can afford to make a unilateral no first use pledge. Because with this gesture,tensions can start to thaw.
Then the second step is a little bit bitter for NATO to swallow,but still affordable. That is NATO pledges to halt any further expansion of the alliance in exchange for Moscow to adopt no first use policy. NATO would say,why should I stop expansion when other countries want to join? My argument is that at least NATO’s expansion so far has a role in Russia’s response if it is not the whole reason because Russian leaders keep talking about it.
From another realistic point of view,right now there are only three countries on the waiting list to join NATO. That is Bosnia and Herzegovina,Georgia,and Ukraine. All these three countries have some troubled relationship with Russia,because they want to join NATO. Georgia and Ukraine,one had a war with Russia,another one is having a war with Russia. So these three countries’ entry into NATO would bring more trouble than benefit. Since there aren't other countries waiting to join,I believe it is affordable for NATO.
And then in Asia,China and Russia have already agreed to no first use against each other,apparently,because of the good relationship. But if China and the United States could reach a similar agreement,then it would deescalate a lot of potential conflicts involving American allies.
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本文僅代表作者個人觀點(diǎn)。
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